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Introduction
In my PhD thesis I focus on bank capital structure, risk appetite and hybrid ﬁnancing in-
struments, i.e. Contingent Convertible bonds (CoCos). I assess optimal bank ﬁnancing and
investment behaviour shaping its risk appetite. I conduct both a theoretical analysis with
empirical application on the ﬁnancing side and an empirical analysis on the investment one.
The main goal of our research is to understand bank's risk appetite in presence of growth
opportunities and a ﬁnancing structure including CoCo bonds, hybrid capital securities that
absorb losses when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain threshold. We conduct
our analysis in two steps, assessing the bank risk appetite in presence of franchise value ﬁrst in
a context of standard ﬁnancing, second introducing CoCo bonds. The thesis consists of three
chapters. Chapter 1, "How to Shape Risk Appetite in Presence of Franchise Value?"(with
G. Barone-Adesi), Chapter 2, "Optimal Bank Risk Appetite in a World of CoCos"(with G.
Barone-Adesi) and Chapter 3 "CoCo Bonds and Write Down bonds impact on Banks'Risk
Appetite and Investment Policy"(with T. Nefedova, G. Pratobevera and A. Ruzza).
Chapter 1: How to shape risk appetite in presence of franchise value? (with
Giovanni Barone-Adesi)
The ﬁrst paper is a joint work with Giovanni Barone-Adesi. We investigate the shape of the
risk appetite of our bank and the role played by the monetary policy in framing it. Bank
objective function and its risk appetite are determined by the interplay of the default option
and the down-and-out call (DOC) option, pricing the franchise value, i.e. the net present
value of non-observable bank's growth opportunities. We deﬁne the objective function as the
ratio between the sum of the two options' prices and the market value of the tangible assets.
Our major contribution consists in assessing risk appetite in three dimensions, allowing also
the monetary policy to play a role on risk appetite and to work jointly with the bank manager
in the optimization of the objective function. We test our optimizations on a sample of 1436
banks, listed in the US, over 1980-2014. We ﬁnd that the optimal risk-free rate is higher with
respect to the existing one in the last period. The objective function is magniﬁed for lower
values of leverage, which is straightforward given our speciﬁcations and optimal volatility
should stay low in order not to erode the franchise value. The monetary policy maker should
play a role for an eﬀective risk appetite optimization. We show that regulators should tune
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their recommendations depending on the targeted cluster, since the driver of risk appetite
alternates between the two options depending on the cluster and on the underlying variable
considered, given the other two. Furthermore, introducing the franchise value in the speciﬁ-
cation of risk appetite, we propose an incentive for the manager to adopt a policy long-term
oriented. There is still ample room for the regulator to ﬁnd the proper instruments in order
to boost banks growth on one side, and consequently help economic growth, and to prevent
them undertaking excessive risks on the other side.
Our paper is based on the seminal works by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973a),
where the liabilities of a company are seen as an European option written on the assets of
a ﬁrm. The endogenization of the default threshold, proposed by Leland and Toft (1996),
provides alone not a clear improvement with respect to the standard Merton model, unless a
jump component is introduced, as in Leland (2006). Our study is more related to Brockman
and Turtle (2003), who introduce in equity path dependency, i.e. equity can be knocked out
whenever a legally binding barrier is breached. Hugonnier and Morellec (2017) propose a
dynamic model of banking assessing the impact of the main instruments in Basel III. On the
other side, leverage requirements decrease default risk and increase growth opportunities of
the bank, on the long-run, which is partly in line with our ﬁndings. Additionally, raising
equity requirements make the loss to be borne by shareholders and the distance to default
increases (see e.g. Admati and Hellwig (2013)). The model we propose relies on regulatory
principles: Basel III indicates a bank is insolvent if the common equity tier one (from now
on CET1) is below 4.5%. It is true that in some countries banks, that would be declared
insolvent for Basel III, still run their assets. Thus, a possible extension to this model would
consider the interplay between an exogenous default barrier set by the regulator and the
endogenous one chosen by the bank, highlighting an important weakness in monitoring by
the regulator.
Chapter 2: Optimal Bank Risk Appetite in a World of CoCos. (with Giovanni
Barone-Adesi
In the post- Lehman Brothers failure, governments announced the end of the too big to fail.
In this context, issuing loss absorbing instruments has gained increasing popularity. Between
2009 and 2015, banks issued more than 380 billion of CoCos 1. Regulation plays a crucial role
in determining CoCos'issuance. Under Basel III, CoCo bonds are eligible as either Additional
Tier 1 (AT1) or Tier 2 (T2), which are types of capital apparently preferred by banks with
1Data from Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Quarterly Rated and Tracked CoCo Monitor Database-
Year End 2015
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respect to equity to accomplish regulatory requirements, given that they are cheaper and less
dilutive than issuing equity. Their introduction into the ﬁnancing structure of our banks is
relevant from a regulation and risk management point of view.
In the second paper, prepared in collaboration with Giovanni Barone-Adesi, we introduce
CoCo bonds in the ﬁnancing structure of our bank and see how the shape of the bank risk
appetite changes. Some of the characteristics of CoCo bonds are key in understanding the
dynamics of risk appetite. In our model, the manager acts in order to accomplish regulatory
requirements. Focusing on capital requirements, Basel III rule requires banks to fund them-
selves with at least 4.5% of common equity of risk-weighted assets (RWAs). The regulator
allows for an extra 1.5% of Additional Tier 1 (AT1) that together with the CET1 concurs to
compose the minimum level of 6% of Tier 1 capital over RWAs. Hence, in order to be compli-
ant with this ratio, the manager has discretionary power over two variables: CoCos issuance
and assets' volatility. On one side, issuing CoCos, which are eligible for AT1, the manager
increases the numerator of the ratio, enlarging the Tier 1. On the other side, the manager
might decrease the RWAs. RWAs are a weighted sum of banks' assets, thus we refer to this
ﬁgure as the total assets' volatility. Through this capital requirement ratio, the regulator
provides an incentive for decreasing assets' volatility. Optimizing the level of risk appetite,
the manager should focus on the maximization of the bank objective function, which is given
by the sum of the two options (default put option and down-and-out call option). In this
model, we have an additional optimization variable, with respect to the basic model outlined
in the ﬁrst paper: the proportion of CoCos to issue with respect to the total amount of debt.
Hence, the manager has discretionary power over the level of leverage, the proportion of
CoCos to issue and the assets' and franchise value's volatility. The last optimizing variable
is the policy rate: this is a relevant variable to be assessed in this context. Nowadays it
is near zero or negative, thus it pushes the bank to substitute assets into more risky ones,
pretending to get higher returns. In this framework, we argue that monetary policy makers
drive the banks assets' volatility to higher levels, on the contrary the regulators attempt to
mitigate this through the capital requirement ratio's incentive to decrease RWAs. Which one
of the two incentives has the greater impact over our objective function? For higher levels
of volatility, the default put option is magniﬁed and the down-and-out call (DOC) option
is more likely to expire worthless because of the higher probability of breaching the barrier.
Vice versa, for lower levels of volatility, this probability is smaller, increasing the DOC option
value even more thanks to the CoCos ﬁnancing that are widening the distance to the barrier.
Nevertheless, we consider also the case where their cushion function is weakened because of
the consequent decrease in the market value of equity given that the market might discount
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the CoCos' conversion as a signal of a forthcoming default. Our contribution to the existent
literature, is again to assess risk appetite in a multi-dimensional perspective and to account
for diﬀerences among banks' clusters which are even more relevant in a world with CoCos.
Furthermore, we address the pros and cons of the regulation in force, based on a ratio giving
interesting incentives and a monetary policy allowing for negative interest rates.
Attaoui and Poncet (2015) develop the model showing that credit spread on straight debt
is lower if the ﬁrm has WD bonds in its ﬁnancing structure, given the cushion function of
the WDs with respect to the straight debt (senior). CoCos are nearer to equity because in
some states of the world they are not debt. Chen et al. (2013) show that replacing some
straight debt with CoCos lowers the endogenous default barrier and therefore increases the
ﬁrm's ability to mitigate a loss in asset value. A natural direction for future research is
to consider the impact of wealth transfer among diﬀerent categories of stakeholders, which
should be relevant for governments. Roy and El-Herraoui (2016) demonstrate the complexity
of designing a fair and eﬀective bail-in regime. The regulator is mainly confronted with the
choice of implementing or not the wealth transfer. If it chooses to do so, it faces the risk of
requests for compensation and arbitrage behavior in ﬁnancial markets.
Chapter 3: CoCo Bonds and Write Down bonds impact on Banks' Risk Ap-
petite and Investment Policy (with T. Nefedova, G. Pratobevera and A. Ruzza)
Theoretical literature has widely assessed hybrid capital, on the contrary there is a small
empirical literature, given the scarcity data. Scepticism around CoCos come from their short
track record, as they were introduced only in 2009 in the banking industry, making their
performance not yet tested during bad times. In the paper, written jointly with Tamara
Nefedova, Giuseppe Pratobevera and Alessio Ruzza, the main goal is to assess empirically
banks' risk appetite and investment policy when their ﬁnancing structure includes contingent
convertible bonds (CoCos) and (or) write-down bonds (WDs), hybrid capital securities that
absorb losses when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain threshold. The main
diﬀerence between the two ﬁnancing instruments is that CoCos convert to equity, while WDs
convert to zero. We aim to study the impact on bank risk appetite of issuing WDs/CoCos,
and what happens to the bank investment policy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst attempt to address these questions empirically. From 2009 to 2014, about half of the Co-
Cos outstanding were eligible as AT1 and in 2015 about 76% were AT1 CoCos. The greatest
amount of CoCos issued worldwide is in Europe, hence this is the appropriate environment
to study CoCos and WDs issues. The conclusions of this study are relevant for both the
US and European regulators, ﬁnancial decision-makers and investors. What is the impact of
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introducing hybrid capital like CoCos and WDs into banks' ﬁnancing structure on their risk
appetite and medium and long-term investment decisions? The only existent comprehensive
empirical study on CoCos is conducted by Avdjiev et al. (2015). They interestingly show that
CoCos issuance reduces banks' credit risk and investors in CoCos view those instruments as
risky and place a signiﬁcant likelihood on the possibility of conversion.
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Chapter 1
How to shape risk appetite in presence of
franchise value?2
Abstract
We propose a model where risk appetite is determined by the interplay of the default
put option and the down-and-out call option, pricing the franchise value. The bank
manager takes incremental decisions maximizing his objective function, i.e. the sum
of the two options, adjusting jointly the level of leverage, assets and franchise value
volatility and the policy rate. Risk appetite is given by the ﬁrst order derivatives. We
show that regulators should tune their recommendations depending on the targeted
cluster, since the driver of risk appetite alternates between the two options depending
on the cluster and on the underlying variable considered. We ﬁnd that the optimal
policy rate for stability is higher with respect to the existing one in the last period. The
modelling framework and the insights emerging from the cluster analysis are our major
contribution to the existent literature.
Keywords : risk appetite, policy rate, default put option, down-and-out call option, franchise
value, assets and franchise' volatility, leverage.
JEL: G21, G32, G38, E52
2We acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Europlace Institute of Finance (EIF) and the Labex Louis
Bachelier (Grant 2014)
6
1 Introduction
The main goal of our research is to understand bank's risk appetite. The modelling framework
and the insights emerging from the cluster analysis are our major contribution to the existent
literature. We ﬁnd what are the main drivers for risk appetite and their impact on both the
bank market value and its franchise value. Bank risk appetite is determined by the interplay
of the default put option, and the franchise value, i.e. the net present value of non-observable
bank's growth opportunities, priced through a down-and-out call option. The franchise value
is not directly observable: how can we evaluate this ﬁgure? We rely on Barone-Adesi et al.
(2014) pricing it through the down-and-out call option and we propose to estimate it implicitly
from the equity market value, extending the standard structural models. Risk appetite is
determined by the manager objective function which we propose it to be the sum of the two
options, since these are the key determinants of the bank market value. We propose two
ways to reach the goal of shaping risk appetite. First, we suggest a two steps optimization
problem, second, we assess risk appetite in a state space model. In the ﬁrst step of the
optimization problem, we estimate the non observable quantities, namely the franchise value
and the market value of the assets. The optimization procedure is based on the non-linear
least squares estimator, through which we minimize the distance between the equity market
value ﬁgures and our model. We discriminate banks with and without franchise value and
subsequently we perform a cluster analysis based on leverage. Given the industry in which
we perform our analysis, we rely on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision deﬁnition
for leverage3, i.e. the ratio between the tier one and the total exposure. In our model,
the total exposure is given by the franchise value and, thus, the market value of the assets.
The Federal Reserve announced that the minimum Basel III leverage ratio would be 6%
for systemically important ﬁnancial institution banks and 5% for their insured bank holding
companies. Hence, we encounter those thresholds as reference point given that our empirical
analysis is based on US banks. In the second step, we optimize the objective function, given by
the sum of the two options, evaluating risk appetite simultaneously with respect to leverage,
volatility and the policy rate. The ﬁrst-order derivatives of this function determines the bank
risk appetite. The determinant of the Hessian matrix tells us in which direction the manager
optimizes this function. In our model, the bank manager should align her policy within the
regulator framework. The bank manager sets the Vega4 equal to zero (volatility-driven risk
appetite) simultaneously with the derivative with respect to the leverage (leverage-driven
3We refer to Basel III deﬁnition.
4Objective function pricing sensitivity with respect to change in the implied volatility.
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risk appetite), and with the rho5 equal to zero (policy rate-driven risk appetite). We stress
the importance of performing simultaneously this optimization among the three variables,
since, in our framework, it is important their joint impact over the bank risk appetite. The
second order and joint derivatives are relevant in the optimization procedure, since the sign
of the determinant of the Hessian matrix gives us the direction of the bank policy. The
manager has discretionary power over volatility and leverage. Nevertheless, we focus also
on the optimal value of the policy rate in order to understand the level that would grant
stability for each bank and, thus, for the whole banking system. In our case, it is the rate
that, together with the optimal values for the other two variables, maximizes the bank value.
We stress the diﬀerence between our optimal policy rate and the risk-free rate given by the
monetary policy. The latter is determined by a number of other factors that are not the
subject of this paper. The pricing of the two options is designed to have diﬀerent impact
on the appetite for risk of our bank depending on the cluster we focus on and the variable
we consider. The regulators should tune their recommendations depending on the targeted
cluster in order to be eﬀective. This is an element of primary interest because regulation
does not diﬀerentiate enough in the banking industry and ﬂat recommendations do not ﬁt
all the peculiarities we ﬁnd in clustering the industry. Our speciﬁcation of objective function
returns a three-dimensional perspective and addresses the main instruments of regulation.
Thus, it can be a useful instrument for the regulator, allowing for a more comprehensive
understanding of the joint impact of the three optimizing variables.
Our empirical sample consists of 1436 listed US banks and the time span considered is
1980-2014. We perform a cluster analysis in order to accommodate for the main diﬀerences
across the industry. First of all, we distinguish between banks with franchise value and
without. We ﬁnd that about the 15% of the banks in the sample do not have franchise value
at least in one year of the time span considered. Second, we cluster our sub-samples into
three categories depending on leverage. The main results for the sub-sample of banks without
franchise value are easy to predict since the put option is the only player in the objective
function optimization and in determining the shape of risk appetite. More interestingly, we
assess the sub-sample of banks with a portfolio of growth opportunities and we cluster it as
follows: (i) over-capitalized banks (cluster 21), with an actual average leverage of 11.12%,
(ii) average capitalized banks (cluster 22) with 7.41% and (iii) under-capitalized banks
(cluster 23) with 4.28%.
We perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the three optimizing variables in order
5Objective function sensitivity with respect to change in the policy rate.
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to understand the shape of risk appetite moving one of the three variables given the optimal
quantities for the other two. Furthermore, we disentangle which option is the main driver
among the three clusters6. Considering leverage, the risk appetite is determined ﬁrst by the
default put option, then by the down-and-out call one. There is a diﬀerence in the leverage-
driven risk appetite at a cluster level related to the positioning of the peak. On the volatility
side, both the options contribute in shaping the objective function but the default put option
is an early operator with respect to the down-and-out call one. As the leverage decreases, the
volatility-driven risk appetite is smaller, since the risk appetite peaks goes to the left-hand
side. Concerning the policy rate, the shape of risk appetite is a concave function in all the
three cases, with minor diﬀerences among the clusters. The down-and-out call option drives
the shape at the beginning leaving the place to the put one afterwards. In cluster 21, the
bell-shape is quite symmetric, instead in the other two it is right-skewed. Empirically, we
always ﬁnd that the estimated policy rate is higher relative to the actual one in the last
period. Increasing the leverage, the optimized objective function naturally decreases (since it
is partly determined by the franchise value, but this is due to our deﬁnition of leverage). The
risk appetite is assessed through the behaviour of its three main drivers and the associated
shape is quite diﬀerent among the clusters.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a literature review. Section 3 presents
the model and the pricing of the options. The two step optimization problem is described
in Section 4. Section 5 shows the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. Further material is
given in the appendix.
2 Literature review
This paper is related to several diﬀerent strands of the literature. First of all, the building
blocks of the literature about structural models are considered. Second, regulation issues are
reviewed from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Third an overview on growth
opportunities evaluation issues is presented.
Our paper is based on the seminal works by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973a),
where the liabilities of a company are seen as an European option written on the assets of
a ﬁrm. In the case of Merton (1973a), the capital structure of a ﬁrm is composed by a
zero-coupon bond, as debt, and equity. At the beginning of the period, debt holders hold a
6These results are in line with the signs of the ﬁrst order derivatives of the objective function with respect
to the optimizing variables.
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portfolio consisting of the face value of debt and a short position on a European put option.
Instead, equity holders hold a European call option on the market value of assets, with strike
equal to the face value of debt. Under the non arbitrage assumption, the price of this option
is equal to the market value of equity. Default can happen only at maturity and standard
Black-Scholes world assumptions7hold.
Several studies extend the original model considering the assumptions by Black and Sc-
holes. Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) allows for default also prior
to maturity. Merton (1977, 1978) examines default risk in banks, with several issues that
were addressed by recent literature. In those cases, equity is considered as a barrier option
and the default event is triggered at the ﬁrst hitting time of an exogenously determined
barrier.
The endogenization of the default threshold, proposed by Leland and Toft (1996), pro-
vides alone not a clear improvement with respect to the standard Merton model, unless a
jump component is introduced, as in Leland (2006). Our study is more related to Brockman
and Turtle (2003), who introduce in equity path dependency, i.e. equity can be knocked
out whenever a legally binding barrier is breached. We assess the market value of equity
building on Babbel and Merrill (2005). In their model, the franchise value and the default
put option accrue to equity holders Barone-Adesi et al. (2014) argue that the risk appetite
of ﬁnancial intermediaries is determined by the interplay of default put option and growth
opportunities.Our contribution to the existent literature is the modelling framework we pro-
pose. Starting from those seminal studies, we assess risk appetite in a three-dimensional
framework, in order to understand the joint impact our three variables have on each other
and on the bank risk appetite.
The model we propose relies on regulatory principles: Basel III indicates a bank is insol-
vent if the common equity tier one (from now on CET1) is below 4.5%. It is true that in
some countries banks, that would be declared insolvent for Basel III, still run their assets.
Thus, a possible extension to this model would consider the interplay between an exogenous
default barrier set by the regulator and the endogenous one chosen by the bank, highlighting
an important weakness in monitoring by the regulator.
From a social point of view, Hugonnier and Morellec (2017) provide a measure for social
beneﬁts of regulation, in order to avoid the burden of a bank default to be beared by the
taxpayers. It would be interesting to extend our model to the too-big-to-fail banks. In this
case, Lucas and McDonald (2006) build their modelling of the public guarantee in a Sharpe
7Such as perfect markets, continuous trading, constant volatility, deterministic and constant interest rates,
inﬁnite liquidity and Ito dynamics for the process of the market value of the assets in place
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(1976) and Merton (1977) framework, where the insurance is a put option on the assets'
value. For a ﬁrm with guaranteed debt, equity value has another component with respect
to the standard call option on the operating assets: the public guarantee. It is assumed to
accrue to equity holders, since it is equivalent to writing a put option, from the government
point of view.
Another main ingredient in our study is franchise value, which is the net present value of
future growth opportunities.
The underlying framework, for our model, is given by Froot and Stein (1998) who found
the rational for risk management arises from the concavity of the franchise value.
3 Research methodology
3.1 The model
The subject of our study is a bank held by shareholders who beneﬁt from limited liability.
They discount cash ﬂows at a constant interest rate.
The structure of the balance sheet, in book values, is given as follows. The bank owns a
portfolio of risky assets and liquid reserves, and is ﬁnanced by insured deposits, risky debt
and equity. On the left hand side of the balance sheet, risky assets are relative illiquid due to
informational problems (see e.g. Hugonnier and Morellec (2017) and Froot and Stein (1998).
For the while, assuming there are no costs of raising funds, liquidity reserves do not play a
role. On the right hand side of the balance sheet, the focus of the analysis is on risky debt
and equity, instead deposits are seen as a relative stable source of ﬁnancing for the bank (see
Hanson et al. (2014)).
Going to market values, debt is seen as a portfolio of cash plus a short position in a put
option on ﬁrm value as in Merton (1974) and equity as a call option on assets as in Black
and Scholes (1973). In our model, we focus on the interplay between the standard default
put (PUT def ) option and the down-and-out call (DOC) option that accrue to shareholders.
Main assumptions and model description
In this subsection, we introduce the main assumptions of our model, building on the funda-
mental work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), and the following insights by
Babbel and Merrill (2005) and Barone-Adesi et al. (2014).
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The setting of the underlying model deals with continuous time, with initial date t = 0
and terminal date t = T . No frictions, like transaction costs, taxes and costs of raising funds,
nor limits on short sales are considered and no riskless arbitrage opportunities exist. Agents
are risk-neutral and there are no conﬂicts of interest between shareholders and managers. The
focus of the project is to understand how the regulator should set appropriate risk-taking
incentives, given that the bank is maximizing its end of the period equity market value.
Initially, shareholders contribute the entire equity of the bank and, subsequently, consider
operating a debt-equity swap at t0, where debt has face value FV
SD. The proceeds from debt
issue are invested in the assets in place and future growth opportunities (i.e. franchise value)
that at time T are worth A (T ) and Fr (T ), respectively. The franchise value materializes
only at the end of the period, T , but it might vanish previously, as soon as the liabilities
exceeds the asset value in 0 ≤ t ≤ T , that is when
τFr=0 = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : A (t) ≤ FV SD +Dep} . (1)
This is slightly diﬀerent with respect toDemsetz et al. (1996) or Jones et al. (2011), because
in their model this value is lost in case of bankruptcy. We call the market value of the assets
(MVA) the sum of the tangible value of the assets and franchise value. Their dynamic is:
d ln (MVA (t)) =
(
µMVAt −
σ2MVA
2
t
)
dt+ σMVAdBt, (2)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, the drift, µt, is time-varying and σ is constant
and both are referred to the sum of the tangible value of the assets and the franchise value.
The default can occur only at the end of the period, T , in case liabilities exceed assets.
For simplicity, we ﬁx the risk-free rate and dividend issues equal to zero. Similar to
Babbel and Merril (2005) and Barone-Adesi, Farkas and Medina (2014), we split the value
of the bank into three components. First, considering the limited liability, the market value
of the equity of our bank is a call option on the assets:
E(T ) := max(A(T )− L), (3)
where A is the value of the banks' assets and L the face value of the liabilities. Second, let's
split the value of equity into the following two components:
E(T ) := X(T ) + Putdef (T ), (4)
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where X(T ) := A(T ) − L is the net tangible value of the bank, without considering the
limited liability, which is represented through the default put option. Third, we allow the
bank to be able to invest in value creating opportunities at time T, through the introduction
of the franchise value (Fr(T )). Hence,
E(T ) := X(T ) + Putdef (T ) + Fr(T ). (5)
The bank's balance sheet at time zero can be summarized as follows:
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Deposits: D(0)
Short term liabilities: SL(0)
Long term Liabilities: LL(0)
Tangible Assets: A(0)
Default Put Option: PutDef (0)
DOC Option: DOC(0)
Intangible Assets: PutDef (0) +DOC(0) Total Liabilities: D(0) + L(0)
Shareholder Equity: MVE(0)
Total: A(0)+PutDef (0)+DOC(0) Total: D(0) + L(0) +MVE(0)
Table 1: Bank balance sheet at time zero.
Taking into account the diﬀerent sources of ﬁnancing for our bank (deposits, standard
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debt and CoCos), the end of the period equity market value is given by the three components:
the net tangible value, the shareholders' option to default and the franchise value.
MVE(T )=
 A(T )+Fr(T )+Putdef (T )−L(T )−D(T ) if MV A(T )≥(L(T )+D(T ))
(L(T )+D(T ))−A(T ) if MV A(T )<(L(T )+D(T ))
. (6)
In the expressions above, we show that the franchise value come to fruition in case the
tangible value of the assets do not fall below the contemporaneous value of the liabilities and
deposits. We comment on the barrier in the context of the DOC pricing. Furthermore, in case
the franchise value do not vanish, the put option is out of the money and the shareholders
do not exercise the put option and its present value is still given by the option price that can
be potentially exercised in the future. The opposite is true when the tangible value of the
assets is eroded. In order to clarify the economic interpretation of the table above, we show
here the terminal claim on the DOC option is:
DOC(T )=
 F (T ) if MV A(T )≥(L(T )+D(T ))
0 otherwise
; (7)
At time zero, equity market value exceeds the capital supplied by the shareholders and this
diﬀerence comes from the value at time zero of the franchise value and the option shareholders
have to default. We give the pricing of those options in the following sections.
3.2 Pricing the default option
Following the reasoning in Barone-Adesi et al. (2014), bank shareholders are long on the
default option, which the manager has to maximize acting on behalf of the shareholders.
The pricing formula for the value of the put option at time zero together with the DOC
one we present in the following section, considers the franchise value as major ingredient
both in the underlying value and in the volatility. The franchise value has to be taken into
account in the market value of the assets. This is necessary in order to prevent potential
arbitrage opportunities, that could arise otherwise, buying the bank and selling short the
tangible assets and the franchise value, if this last one would not be considered. The put
option is a convex, decreasing function of the asset value and is maximized when the value
of the liabilities, as well as the riskiness of the assets is magniﬁed. This means it is a a
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driver for risk-taking. The underlying is given by MVA, the value of the net tangible assets
at the beginning of the period, and Fr the franchise value. The strike price is the market
value for straight debt, MV SD8. T is the time to maturity, σMVA is the volatility of both
the assets and the franchise value and rf is the policy rate. From this paragraph on, we
relax the hypothesis regarding the risk-free rate, allowing it to ﬂuctuate both in the positive
and negative domain. We deﬁne leverage following Basel regulators criterion, i.e. the ratio
between the Tier1 and the total exposure, which we subsume in the market value of the
assets considering this way both the value of the tangible assets and the value of future
growth opportunities. Our pricing of the default put option is given by:
Putdef (lev, σMVA, rf) =
(
MV SD +D
)
Φ (−d2) +
(− (MVA) Φ (−d1)) ,
with {τFr=0 > T},
where d1 =
 ln( 11−lev )+(rf+σ2MVA2 )T
σMVA
√
T
 ,
lev =
(
T ier1
MVA
)
, d2 = d1 − σMVA
√
T ,
(8)
We consider without loss of generality Φ the standard Normal. In absence of growth
opportunities, the pricing formula goes back to the standard one. The greeks for this option
are given as follows:
Sensitivity to leverage :
[
δPutdefi,t
δlevi,t
]
< 0
Sensitivity to volatility :
[
δPutdefi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to policy − rate :
[
δPutdefi,t
δrfi,t
]
< 0.
(9)
This option push the bank manager to adopt a risk-taking policy. We present further infor-
8We proxy the market value for the straight debt with the KMV model (KMV corporation).
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mation about the sensitivity of the default put option with respect to volatility, leverage and
policy rate in the optimization section.
3.3 Pricing the DOC option, in presence of non-observable under-
lying
At time T , F (T ) represents a portfolio of positive net present value growth opportunities.
Before maturity, the expected value of Fr(T ) is embedded in the value of the risky assets
of the bank and is the franchise value which is given by the DOC option (see Barone-Adesi
et al. (2014)). This option is a down and out call, with a pricing formula that is slightly
diﬀerent from a mathematical point of view with respect to the standard one in Black-Scholes
framework (Merton (1973a)), but it confers a much diﬀerent economic interpretation, where
Fr(0) constitutes the value of potential growth net of investment cost in the case the bank
does not opt for default. Since investment costs are already considered in Fr(0), the strike
for this option is set to zero. The barrier is given by the market value of standard debt and
deposits. This option is priced in an European framework given that the franchise value
comes to fruition only at maturity9, but it is path dependent. In case the barrier is breached
before maturity the option expires and the franchise value is driven immediately to zero. The
extended standard pricing is given as follows:
DOC (lev, σMVA, rf) = Fr [Φ (v1) +
− (1− lev)2λ Φ (y1)
]
with {τFr=0 > T} ,
where λ =
rf+
σ2MVA
2
σ2MVA
v1 =
ln( 11−lev )
σMVA
√
T
+ λσMVA
√
T , y1 =
ln(1−lev)
σMVA
√
T
+ λσMVA
√
T
(10)
The franchise value, Fr(0), is not directly observable. However, we present below how to
estimate it in the framework of our model. Indeed, the value of the DOC option is a part of
the market value of the assets, where the remaining is given by the tangible assets. The term
in parenthesis gives the pricing probability that the intermediary will survive long enough for
9that is equivalent to say that we can exercise it only at maturity
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the growth opportunities to come to fruition. The standard greeks for this option are given
as follows:
Sensitivity to leverage :
[
δDOCi,t
δlevi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to volatility :
[
δDOCi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to policy − rate :
[
δDOCi,t
δrfi,t
]
> 0
(11)
We show in the following sections when the DOC prevails over the default put one in deter-
mining the shape of objective function and consequently the one of risk appetite.
3.4 The optimization problem for risk appetite
Risk appetite is a non-negative real number that describes investor's appetite for risk, with
higher values corresponding to a greater degree of aggression. Risk appetite is commonly
deﬁned as the level and type of risk a ﬁrm is able and willing to assume in its exposures and
business activities, given its business objectives and obligations to stakeholders. We prefer to
understand the appetite for risk of the bank, rather than concentrate on risk-taking, because,
in the deﬁnition we propose, the default put option promote risk-seeking instead the DOC
one is designed to refrain the bank to undertake excessive risk. A rising risk appetite implies
that investors are willing to hold riskier assets, obtained through assets' substitution. Since
it is not possible to observe directly risk appetite, we need to understand how it is determined
and where to extract information about its manifestation. From both a risk-management and
a regulation point of view, it is a priority to infer some information about objective function
in the banking system.
In case the market value of the assets exceeds the bank liabilities, the two determinants of
the market value of the equity are the down-and-out call option and the default put option.
Hence, we deﬁne the manager objective function (O.f.) as the sum of the two options:
O.f.i,t := DOC
(
levi,t, σMVAi,t , rfi,t
)
+ PUT def
(
levi,t, σMVAi,t , rfi,t
)
. (12)
We investigate the risk appetite of the bank over three variables: leverage, assets and
franchise value volatility and the policy rate. The bank manager has decision power only
over the ﬁrst two, but we aim to understand the optimal policy rate which should grant
stability. The risk appetite is determined in the optimization problem we present in Section
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5.2 and is given by the ﬁrst order derivatives and the determinant of the Hessian matrix.
The optimization problem is twofold because in the ﬁrst step we estimate the franchise
value and the market value of the tangible assets that are not observable in the market, but
are embedded in the equity market value. Those two variables are key in order to perform the
second optimization step, where we look for the optimal level of leverage, assets and franchise
value volatility and policy rate, that simultaneously optimize the objective function.
3.4.1 First step ingredients
In the ﬁrst step, the goal is to estimate the unobservable franchise value and the consequent
market value of the assets. We argue that our unobservable quantities are embedded in the
equity market value. We model the bank equity market value through the put-call parity, as
the sum of the call option on the assets, the default put option and the franchise value, priced
as the DOC option, considering the value of the bank at the time in which the franchise value
comes to fruition.
At the beginning of the period, we consider the following system of equations:
MVEi,t= (Ai,t−(MV SD+D)i,t+DOCi,t+Putdefi,t ),
σMVEi,tMVEi,t= σMVAi,t (MVAi,t)Φ(d1i,t),
where d1i,t =
 ln
(
MVAi,t
(MV SD+D)i,t
)
+
(
rfi,t+
σ2MVAi,t
2
)
T
σMVAi,t
√
T

(13)
This extension of the Merton speciﬁcation allows us to consider the franchise value both at
the underlying and implied volatility level. Since the equity market value incorporates the
information regarding both the assets market value and the franchise value, consequently the
implied volatility estimated in this model refers to the one considering both the assets and
the franchise value. At the beginning of the period we do not have information regarding the
franchise value, so that we consider its price through the DOC option. We solve this problem
through the non-linear least squares criterion function, for each bank at any time t on the
whole time span considered, optimizing the distance between the data concerning the equity
market value and the model extended accommodating for both the default put option and
the DOC one. We perform a step by step optimization for Θi,t := Fri,t, Ai,t, σMVAi,t , building
on the Bellman's Principle of Optimality (Bellman (1952)), applied also in Merton (1973b).
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In order to perform this, we build on the following error function, solving simultaneously: e1,i,t= MVEi,t−(Ai,t−(MV SD+D)i,t+DOC(Θi,t)+Putdef (Θi,t)),
e2,i,t= σMVEi,tMVEi,t−σMVAi,tMVAi,tΦ(d1i,t),
(14)
where {i}n1 is the bank identiﬁcator and {t}m1 the year considered. In this speciﬁcation, we
perform our analysis at the beginning of the period, because we need to estimate the major
ingredients for the objective function optimization. The non linear least square function is
the following:
Θ∗i,t = argmin
∑2,n,m
j,i,t=1
[
e2j,i,t
]
(Θi,t)
(15)
where the optimal quantities are Θ∗i,t, that optimize the sum of the squared deviations, which
are the non-linear least squares estimators. Thus, we can proceed to the next step opti-
mizing the objective function10. At this step, empirically, we proceed in our ﬁrst clustering
distinguishing among banks with franchise value and without.
3.4.2 Second step
In this step, we optimize the objective function to cope with the regulator standard indi-
cations concerning leverage and assets' volatility. Furthermore, we derive also the optimal
policy rate for the stability, ﬁrst, of each bank, and second, of each cluster, aggregating
together the results. The manager optimizes the objective function of the bank, modifying
its exposure to risky assets and adjusting bank's leverage at time zero, operating always for
allowing the franchise value to come to fruition at time T . The shape of risk appetite is
assessed through the determinant of the Hessian matrix in a three-dimensional perspective.
We propose a volatility-driven risk appetite, as well as a leverage-driven one and a policy
rate-driven one. The outline of those optimal quantities diﬀers among clusters depending
on which option drives the behaviour in that speciﬁc case. This is an element of primary
interest because regulation does not diﬀerentiate enough in the banking industry and ﬂat
recommendations do not ﬁt all the peculiarities we ﬁnd in clustering the industry. Fur-
thermore, the impact can be counter-productive, given that diﬀerences among clusters are
relevant and consequences can go in an opposite direction with respect to what is intended
by the regulator.
10As we explain in the following step, we perform the optimization at each time step t, following Bellman
(1952) and Merton (1973b), in order to allow the franchise value of the bank to come to fruition at time T .
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In our framework, where the objective function is driven by the two options, we insist
in setting also rho equal to zero, focusing on the sensitivity of the objective function with
respect to the policy rate (policy rate-driven risk appetite). This is relevant to understand
the joint impact of the three variables and, thus, to derive an optimal rate which should
grant stability at both single bank level and at cluster level, and consequently, for the whole
banking system. The decision variables over which, instead, the manager has discretionary
power at time zero are volatility and leverage. On the bank manager side, the shape of risk
appetite is determined setting equal to zero vega (volatility-driven risk appetite) and the
ﬁrst order derivative with respect to the leverage (leverage-driven risk appetite) 11. All of
those ﬁrst order derivatives are obtained given optimal values for the other two variables.
Our optimization procedure goes beyond what presented till now. We accommodate for
a joint optimization, where the three optimal quantities are estimated simultaneously The
optimization variables are the leverage, the assets' volatility and the policy rate, so our theta
in this case is: Θi,t :=
(
levi,t, σAi,t+Fri,t , rfi,t
)
. When MV SD < (MVA (0) + Fr (0)), the
optimization problem is:
Θ∗i,t =
argmax
Θi,t
[Ofi,t] (16)
In this framework our three-dimensional risk appetite (R.A.) is given by:
leverage− driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δlevi,t
]
= 0 |σ∗Ai,t+Fri,t ,rf∗i,t
volatility − driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δσAi,t+Fri,t
]
= 0 |lev∗i,t,rf∗i,t
policy − rate− driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δrfi,t
]
= 0 |lev∗i,t,σ∗Ai,t+Fri,t
(17)
Numerically, we use the methodology developed by Byrd et al. (1995) which allows box
constraints, that is each variable can be given a lower and/or upper bound. The initial value
must satisfy the constraints. This uses a limited-memory modiﬁcation of the BFGS quasi-
Newton method (Broyden (1970); Fletcher (1970); Goldfarb (1970); Shanno (1970)). The
algorithm always achieve the ﬁnite convergence.
In presence of interest rate risk, diversiﬁcation provides an additional risk management
opportunity. Indeed, if the interest rate and asset risk exposures are of similar magnitude,
11In standard literature, it does not exist a greek letter identifying the sensitivity of an option price with
respect to leverage.
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and if these risks are uncorrelated, then one would expect diversiﬁcation to be very important,
especially if franchise values are high. In this case we perform a pointwise optimization since
we are interested in the parameters that optimize the objective function of each bank on the
whole time span. The optimal objective function do not have theoretical bounds, but we
focus on 0 ≤ O.f.i,t ≤ 1, since it is hard to ﬁnd empirically a bank having the sum of the two
options greater than the market value of the assets (our normalizing quantity). Although
it is well known what is the behaviour of the default put option with respect to the three
variables assessed, the same is not straightforward for the DOC pricing and, consequently,
for our speciﬁcation of objective function. In the appendix we show the derivation of both
the ﬁrst order derivatives and the cross ones, taken into account given the simultaneous
approach. In order to understand which option is the main driver for the objective function
we need to perform a cluster analysis. Section 6 presents the main theoretical results before
showing the empirical ones, thus it will become clearer the shape of the objective function
and the consequent risk appetite one. Our diﬀerentiation among clusters is crucial for setting
eﬀective regulatory recommendations, because ﬂat rules miss the peculiarities of the diﬀerent
patterns of objective function we could appreciate in the clustering. In section 5 we present
results both aggregated and clustered, pointing out the importance of more accurate analysis
in this domain.
4 Results
4.1 What drives our three-dimensional risk appetite? A simulation
exercise
In our deﬁnition of the objective function, two options play a role. When the bank does not
have any consistent portfolio of growth opportunities, the DOC option is worthless so that the
default put option is the only determinant of the objective function and of the risk-appetite.
In this case, it is well known what is the impact of the optimizing variables and consequently
what is the shape for risk appetite. But what happens when the bank has an embedded
franchise value? In this case in a theoretical framework it is not clear which option has the
main impact on the objective function, theoretically which is the main driver and also the
optimization procedure is not trivial. We assess this issue for the banks in the sample having
growth opportunities at stake clustered by leverage12. We cluster our sub-sample of banks
12We present our clustering empirical analysis in Section 6.3.
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with consistent franchise value into three categories: over capitalized banks (cluster 21),
with an actual average leverage13 of 11.12%, average capitalized banks (cluster 22), with
7.41% and under capitalized banks (cluster 23) with 4.28%. Those ﬁgures are in line with
standard literature, given our deﬁnition of leverage that is the ratio between tier 1 and the
bank total exposure (i.e. the sum of the assets' market value and franchise value).
We simulate the option prices, and consequently the objective function value, building on
winsorized average data per cluster. We perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the
three optimization variables in order to understand the shape of the risk appetite. We assess
the shape of risk appetite moving one variable, given the optimal quantities for the other two.
We can see how the optimal path changes among diﬀerent clusters when considering leverage
and volatility. Interestingly, when looking at the policy rate, the objective function shape
is similar in the three clusters. The patterns are entirely presented in the Appendix. We
perform the simulation exercise also in the negative domain for interest rates. We show those
results in the Appendix as well. The negative interest rates impact negatively the optimized
objective function but the magnitudo of this impairment in value is not that relevant relative
to a similar change e.g. in volatility. It would be interesting to see the eﬀect negative rates
have on the other variables and thus assess the joint impact on the objective function.
Leverage
The put option value decreases fast when the tier 1 value increases. The DOC option price
is easy to see that is also a decreasing function of leverage, deﬁned as in Basel III, given that
we put the franchise value at the denominator. In the ﬁrst cluster (21, i.e. over capitalized
banks), the optimal leverage we ﬁnd in the simulation is on average similar to the one we
ﬁnd in the empirical analysis and it decreases with the clusters. Our simulation records as
optimal result the lowest level of leverage (between 5% and 6%), larger than what we ﬁnd
empirically and slightly above the threshold considered by the regulator, even for the cluster
whose average level of leverage is below the threshold recommended.
Volatility
When considering volatility, the put options price is an increasing function, instead the DOC
one is ﬂat and relative high for smaller volatility values and decreasing afterwards. This last
results looks puzzling at a ﬁrst glance, since the DOC is an option and we are used to be
sure about their increase in value when considering volatility. The DOC is a barrier option
13Actual leverage is computed adjusting to our model Basel III deﬁnition.
22
and when volatility is too high, there might be a breaching of the barrier and in this case
we could have a sharp decrease to zero of the option value. The optimal objective function
shape is determined for smaller values of sigma by the default put option and by the DOC
one for larger values of our variable. As the leverage decreases, going from cluster 21 to 23,
the peak for the volatility-driven risk appetite is smaller, since the objective function peaks
goes to the left-hand side. This is the case because a smaller tier 1 means that our barrier
is much higher and I need smaller values of volatility in order to be sure not to cross the
barrier.
Policy rate
When assessing the policy rate change impact on the two options prices we show that the
default put one is a decreasing function, instead the DOC option is an increasing function.
This is due to the design of the option pricing. Risk appetite shape is a concave function in
all the three cases, with minor diﬀerences. In the case of cluster 21, the two options have
almost the same impact in determining objective function, the curve is almost symmetric. In
the cluster 22 and 23, the main driver is the default put option since the risk appetite shape
is skewed to the right. Overall, the optimal policy rate level results slightly high because in
our model we do not consider for the while economic growth in a comprehensive framework.
This will be considered in further work because the franchise value is inﬂuenced by deﬁnition
from economic growth.
4.2 Empirical results at aggregate level
Our empirical sample consists of 1436 listed US banks and the sample period is 1980-2014.
Balance sheet items are taken from COMPUSTAT and considered on an annual basis. Market
prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Price data are taken on a
monthly basis to accommodate the constant volatility hypothesis.
Summary statistics for both the input and the results at aggregate level are presented
in the appendix. We perform our optimizations with several initial values in order to check
we have results numerically stable. Furthermore, we calculated the conﬁdence intervals. We
show those results in the appendix as well. We ﬁnd that the estimate of the risk-free rate is
slightly higher with respect to the actual one especially in the last period, this is due to the
fact that we do not consider economic growth. The following ﬁgure shows the evolution of
both the actual policy rate (on the right y axis) and the optimal one we estimated (on the
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left y axis). In our model we allow for negative interest rates (in order to be coherent with
the current economic situation) but the optimized values are always greater than zero.
Figure 1: Optimal versus Actual policy rate evolution.
We show in the next ﬁgure that our average evaluation of the objective function aggregated
on the whole sample per year and the optimal average quantities for the policy rate-, volatility-
and leverage-driven risk appetite. Aggregated results loose a lot in terms of interpretability
and meaning. In this aggregate dimension the objective function seems to follow the leverage
pattern. On the volatility side, the two move in opposite directions. This means that some
franchise value is eroded but not fully compensated by the default put option. Considering
periods of lower policy rates as signaling a crisis, we can see that our measure for risk appetite
is driven relative higher (that is the case after 2010). We investigate deeper the dynamic of
our optimized objective function with respect to the three variables in the analysis cluster
by cluster. We always represent graphically the objective function as a ratio between the
sum of the two options (i.e. the objective function) and the market value of the assets,
for normalisation reasons. In our model the manager chooses the optimal level of leverage,
asset's volatility at the beginning of the period on the basis of past information so the present
action has an impact on the following period. Our manager's policy considers the franchise
value in its potential status at time t, but is backward looking, in the sense that builds on
past information. The pattern is not straightforward to be interpreted, but in the time span
considered, especially recently, during periods of lower interest rates optimal assets' volatility
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is relative higher because our manager has to shift the bank investments to riskier assets in
order to perform earnings. Vice versa, during periods of relative higher interest rates we can
see a ﬂight to quality, because the bank investing in the risk-free asset is already achieving
a satisfactory performance. This last consideration becomes clearer and more evident when
considering clusters of banks with growth opportunities.
Figure 2: Objective function versus optimal variables evolution.
4.3 Empirical results in a cluster analysis
Results diﬀer a lot when considering our cluster analysis. We perform a two step-clustering,
since we ﬁrst distinguish between banks with franchise value and without, second we cluster
the two subsets of banks with respect to the leverage. The sub-sample of banks without
franchise value accounts for about the 15% of the whole sample. In this case the optimization
of the objective function and risk appetite are driven by the default put option. Thus we
focus on the sub-sample of banks having the franchise value at stake. We categorize this sub-
sample as follows: (i) over capitalized banks (cluster 21), with an actual average leverage of
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11.12%, (ii) average capitalized banks (cluster 22), with 7.41% and (iii) under capitalized
banks (cluster 23) with 4.28%. The input variables for our optimization and the results
are presented cluster by cluster in the appendix, here we present the main results and their
implications. The population of banks is not uniformly distributed across the clusters, this
has an impact on quality of estimates of the sub-sample, but are a close representation of
the reality.
In the following set of pictures, we can see that our estimates for the policy rate is always
tracking the actual one. Only during the last years, where the actual one is driven too low
by the central bank (and even inﬂation is zero), our estimate is relative higher because. The
greater spread across the two is present in the sub-sample of banks which have a portfolio of
growth opportunities (cluster 22), because our optimized objective function and consequently
our risk appetite is driven upwards by the DOC option. This together with a relative low
volatility lead to a very low objective function, since the bank manager optimizes his strategy
investing in the risk-free asset. Banks in cluster 23, with the greatest level of debt, ask for a
remarkably lower optimal policy rate especially in the last ﬁve years where the actual risk-free
rate set by the regulator was at its minima levels, this is possible because of a relative lower
assets' volatility necessary for franchise value preservation.
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Table 2: Actual risk-free rate vs Optimal policy rate, cluster by cluster.
In the next set of pictures we present the resulting optimal estimates for the optimized
objective function and its corresponding variables-driven risk appetite. Even if we do not
present the results of the sub-sample of banks without franchise value, clusters 21, 22 and 23
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point out results much more in line with the aggregated ones, being the greater sub-sample in
terms of number of banks involved. The objective function optimal average values increases
with the clusters, since we ﬁnd that in cluster 21 the average level of objective function is
about 16% instead in cluster 23 it approaches 41%: those clusters present smooth paths.
This is not the case of cluster 22 where we can ﬁnd many swings eve if the average value of
the optimized objective function is about 23%. It is relevant for the regulators to take into
account this evolution since banks in cluster 22 are just above the threshold recommended
by the FED.
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Table 3: optimized objective function evolution against its optimal determinants , cluster by
cluster.
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The simulation results are coherent with what we ﬁnd to be optimal in this empirical
analysis. On average optimal volatility is low due to the fact that on average all the clusters
are characterized by a relative high barrier. At a ﬁrst glance, it seems that under capitaliza-
tion does not harm proﬁtable growth opportunities, hence, the optimized objective function
moves in an opposite direction with respect to leverage. Of course this is partially explained
with the deﬁnition we gave to leverage, where we can ﬁnd the market value of the assets
and the franchise value at the denominator. On the optimal policy rate side, we ﬁnd relative
higher data because we should complete our model taking into account the economic growth.
The evolution of the optimal policy rate moves in line with the optimized objective function,
even if the latter presents wider and delayed ﬂuctuations with respect to this variable.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the shape of the risk appetite of our bank. Bank objective
function and its risk appetite are determined by the interplay of the default option and the
down-and-out call (DOC) option, pricing the franchise value, i.e. the net present value of
non-observable bank's growth opportunities. We deﬁne the objective function as the ratio
between the sum of the two options' prices and the market value of the tangible assets. Our
major contribution consists in assessing risk appetite in a three-dimensional space, providing
an insight of the importance of taking into account the joint impact of the three variables at
both single bank level and cluster one.
First, we estimate the franchise value, and we discriminate banks with and without fran-
chise value. Second, at the beginning of each period, we optimize the objective function
adjusting simultaneously the level of leverage, volatility and the policy rate. The decision
maker sets rho equal to zero considering also the other two variables of her risk manage-
ment policy (policy rate-driven risk appetite). The bank manager sets the Vega equal to
zero (volatility driven-risk appetite) simultaneously with the derivative with respect to the
leverage (leverage-driven risk appetite), and the one with respect to the policy rate. Those
three optimizations are conditional to the other two optimal quantities. We aim to stress the
importance of the joint optimization. It results to convey a more comprehensive understand-
ing of the bank behaviour, rather than sticking on the single elements, whose explanatory
power is much more reduced.
We test our optimizations on a sample of 1436 banks, listed in the US, over 1980-2014. We
ﬁnd that the optimal risk-free rate is higher with respect to the existing one in the last period.
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A clustering analysis is necessary in order to understand the shape of risk appetite, what are
its underlying main drivers and what is the impact of changes in the optimizing variables.
We show that the impact of the single variable on risk appetite is not always the same among
the clusters, this is a result of both structural diﬀerences among the clusters and the joint
impact of the other variables that are simultaneously optimized. The objective function is
magniﬁed for lower values of leverage, which is straightforward given our speciﬁcations and
optimal volatility should stay low in order not to erode the franchise value. We ﬁnd diﬀerent
patterns among the clusters and this imposes a cluster analysis in order to understand risk
appetite behaviour. We show that regulators should tune their recommendations depending
on the targeted cluster, since the driver of risk appetite alternates between the two options
depending on the cluster and on the underlying variable considered, given the other two.
Our three dimensional risk appetite speciﬁcation could be an eﬀective instrument for the
regulator because it comprehends the three most important dimensions for shaping risk
appetite in presence of franchise value. It is determined by the joint optimization, thus
we need to condition on two optimal quantities in order to optimize with respect to the third
one. We consider also a world where interest rates are negative, which is the case for Europe
nowadays. Given our speciﬁcation of objective function, negative interest rates impair the
moneyness of the options but the curve are quite ﬂat, thus ceteris paribus we can argue that
the negative rates in our optimization procedure impact negatively on the objective function,
with a limited magnitudo. Furthermore, introducing the franchise value in the speciﬁcation of
risk appetite, we propose an incentive for the manager to adopt a policy long-term oriented.
There is still ample room for the regulator to ﬁnd the proper instruments in order to boost
banks growth on one side, and consequently help economic growth, and to prevent them
undertaking excessive risks on the other side.
31
Appendix
A: Who drives the risk appetite? A simulation exercise
In the following table we perform a sensitivity analysis to change in the three optimization
variables. We comment in Section 6 how the shape of risk appetite diﬀers among the clusters.
Optimal value ranges:
• for leverage:
Cluster 21 : 0.10 ≤ lev∗ ≤ 0.11
Cluster 22 : 0.07 ≤ lev∗ ≤ 0.08
Cluster 23 : 0.06 ≤ lev∗ ≤ 0.07
(18)
FED benchmarks are:0.08 for 6 Systemically important ﬁnancial institution banks; 0.05
for their insured bank holding ﬁrms.
• for volatility:
Cluster 21 : 0.04 ≤ σ∗ ≤ 0.06
Cluster 22 : 0.02 ≤ σ∗ ≤ 0.04
Cluster 23 : 0.01 ≤ σ∗ ≤ 0.02
(19)
Under-capitalized banks should have a relative lower volatility: higher probability to
cross the barrier and the DOC to expire.
• for policy rate:
Cluster 21 : 0.13 ≤ rf ∗ ≤ 0.15
Cluster 22 : 0.11 ≤ rf ∗ ≤ 0.14
Cluster 23 : 0.04 ≤ rf ∗ ≤ 0.07
(20)
We ﬁnd relative higher optimal values because we do not consider economic growth
and the simulation is based on input values derived from our empirical sample, time
span (1980-2014).
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A simulation exercise: which is the main driver of the objective function between
the two options? 1/3
• The optimal value for leverage in all the three clusters is above the actual levels and
slightly above FED recommendation.
• Our results take into account the franchise value (in the denominator of "leverage")
and this is a main diﬀerence between our results and the regulator ones.
• Given the pricing of the DOC option and the deﬁnition of leverage, the DOC is maxi-
mized for lower levels of leverage.
A simulation exercise: which is the main driver of the objective function between
the two options? 2/3
• The DOC option, being a barrier option, is optimized in our context for relative lower
volatility values: when volatility is too high, there might be a breaching of the barrier
and, consequently, a collapse of the franchise value.
• With smaller values of tier1, going from cluster 21 to 23, the peak of the optimized
objective functions moves to the left.
• For relative smaller tier1, our barrier is much higher and smaller values of volatility
ensure the franchise value preservation.
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Which is the main driver of the objective function between the two options? 3/3
• The optimized objective function displays a concave shape, with minor diﬀerences in
the peak depending on the cluster.
• Once it is clear our risk appetite speciﬁcation, the policy maker change in the rate has
a clear impact.
• Overall, our optimal policy rate results slightly high because in our model we do not
consider economic growth and inﬂation.
Life below zero: optimization results taking into account negative interest rates
Interest rates' decline dates back to the 1990s14. Since the global ﬁnancial crisis, inﬂation
has been low worldwide, and output below potential. This is the reason why in our model
we do not diﬀerentiate between real and nominal rate15. Central bankers set policy rates at
record low levels in advanced economies, and in the past few years16, the European Central
14"Assessing the implications of negative interest rates", Speech by Benoit Coeure', YALE, July 28, 2016
15Negative real rates are have been a reality on German deposits.
16June 2014
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Bank (ECB) became the ﬁrst central bank to lower the rate of interest on their deposit
facility into the negative domain. Furthermore, we take into account that also the return
on government bonds is negative for most European countries17 and Japan, even at long
maturities. Hence, we need to accommodate for a negative discount rate in our model. In
the previous sections, we optimize our model allowing the policy rate to range from −5% to
+33% but the optimization ﬁgures are always in the positive domain and greater than zero.
In this section we re-perform both the simulation exercise and the optimization for negative
policy rates ranging only in the negative domain. Given that our objective function is fully
characterized by the default put and DOC option, negative interest rate (in simpliﬁed terms)
implies that it's less likely for the option to be in the money at expiration (for both the
options) and add a discount to the option instead of a premium (on the DOC side). The
major results concerning this procedure are converging for the three clusters, as we show in
the following graph.
Figure 3: Optimal objective function simulation for varying negative policy rates, cluster by
cluster.
The options determining the objective function loose value for negative rates and recover it
when approaching the zero upper bound. In this simulation we allowed the negative rate
to decrease till −5%. The shape of the curve in this negative domain for the interest rate,
do not diﬀer too much between the two options because for both of them the moneyness
is impaired. In this graph we show that in the simulation we reach an upper bound for
17including Switzerland, with a negative rate on the longest maturity
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the objective function at a zero level of the policy rate, when constraining it to the range
[−5%, 0]. Allowing for such a range, we perform the optimization of the objective function
and we found that the optimal policy rate is always zero. This is reasonable given the
deﬁnition of the objective function itself. In the real world, hopefully, the policy rate is not
going so far in the negative domain. Thus, we propose the following graph to focus on a
narrower range [−1%; 0].
Figure 4: Optimal objective function simulation for small variations in negative policy rates,
cluster by cluster.
In this case we are able appreciate the magnitudo of the impact such discount rate has on the
option value. The curve are quite ﬂat, thus ceteris paribus we can argue that the negative
rates in our optimization procedure impact negatively on the objective function, but eﬀect
is not that relevant as in the case of small change in values of the other optimizing variables.
We estimate that with a variation of −1% in the policy rate, the objective function decrease
by 1.2% in case of cluster 22, 0.8% in case of cluster 23. In case of cluster 21, there is an
almost zero variation in this second case and a decrease of 1% when the policy rate decrease
by 5%. Nevertheless, we cannot forget the burden the monetary policy maker puts on the
bank manager shoulders setting negative rates. Negative rates provide a strong motivation
to shift the the bank's investments from safer to riskier ones. A possible extension to this
model would consider the required increase in assets' and franchise value's volatility required
to compensate for the negative interest rates.
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B: Conﬁdence intervals
cluster Lower bounds Upper bounds number of observations
21 427347502 1087468847 4244
Average (Franchise Value (NPV)) 22 1294026829 3492363319 4024
(in US$) 23 42450671293 59844573718 1071
21 1828805281 3155078155 4244
Average (Assets (MV)) 22 3531649196 7928260545 4024
(in US$) 23 85686878091 120446364427 1071
21 0.1092981 0.1104778 4244
Average (Optimal leverage) 22 0.07247293 0.07305315 4024
23 0.03814159 0.03974975 1071
21 0.03989881 0.04163346 4244
Average (Optimal volatility) 22 0.03538589 0.03696676 4024
23 0.02201921 0.02396731 1071
21 0.1261484 0.1323115 4244
Average (Optimal policy rate) 22 0.1621953 0.1682553 4024
23 0.1658552 0.1776327 1071
Table 4: Conﬁdence intervals for average optimal estimates.
C: Summary statistics of the optimization ﬁgures at aggregate level
and cluster by cluster
First of all we present summary statistics of our input variables: end-of-year equity market
value, its monthly volatility adjusted on an annual basis, the risk-free rate, existent in the
market in the time span considered, the market value of debt, calculated according to KMV
model in order to account for the value that triggers the franchise value of the bank and the
leverage deﬁned as the ratio between the sum of the market value of the assets (MVA) and
the franchise value (Fr)and the equity market value 18(MVE).
18Leverage data are in line with ﬁndings in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012).
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Variable\Summary statistics Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. sd
Equity market value 1.922e+05 4.324e+07 1.012e+08 1.050e+09 2.784e+08 2.339e+11 7522590845
(in US$)
Equity volatility 0.0610 0.2553 0.3073 0.3484 0.3991 0.4234 0.1474
(annualized)
Risk-free rate 0.0100 0.0700 0.1600 0.1521 0.2200 0.3300 0.0863
Debt market value 3.140e+05 3.971e+08 8.661e+08 1.812e+10 2.263e+09 2.782e+12 124251669021
(in US$)
Leverage 0.02849 0.07118 0.08927 0.09417 0.11500 0.15000 0.03322
tier17 (MVA + Fr)
Table 5: Model inputs summary statistics.
Those are the inputs used to estimate the franchise value ﬁrst and consequently to proceed
in our objective function maximization. We provide in the following table, the summary
statistics for the results of our two-steps optimization at aggregate level: the net present
value (NPV) of the franchise value, the market value (MV) of the assets, the parameters
optimizing pointwise the objective function (leverage, franchise value and assets' volatility
and the optimal risk-free rate).
Variable\Summary statistics Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. sd
Franchise Value (NPV) 0.000e+00 2.667e+06 6.914e+07 6.164e+09 2.450e+08 1.638e+12 52747617409
(in US$)
Assets (MV) 0.000e+00 3.526e+08 7.621e+08 1.342e+10 1.881e+09 3.275e+12 105421665638
(in US$)
Optimal leverage 0.02759 0.07025 0.08802 0.09378 0.11380 0.14840 0.03182165
Optimal volatility 0.00010 0.02561 0.03807 0.04363 0.06247 0.08260 0.02508671
Optimal risk-free rate -0.0500 0.0700 0.1600 0.1461 0.2207 0.33000 0.1012666
Table 6: Results summary statistics.
In the table below we present the output variables for our optimization cluster by cluster.
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Summary statistics/ cluster Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. sd
Variable
21 0.06737 0.09436 0.10490 0.10990 0.12440 0.14250 0.01960008
Optimal leverage 22 0.05112 0.06558 0.07330 0.07276 0.08049 0.09549 0.009386614
23 0.00437 0.02614 0.04046 0.03895 0.05134 0.07656 0.01341079
21 0.001042 0.027460 0.038180 0.040750 0.054170 0.075310 0.02118565
Optimal volatility 22 0.002282 0.025110 0.034470 0.036160 0.047450 0.066650 0.01773035
23 0.00872 0.01791 0.02175 0.02295 0.02810 0.03478 0.0072292
21 -0.0500 0.0500 0.1463 0.1292 0.2100 0.3300 0.1023966
Optimal risk-free rate 22 -0.0500 0.1000 0.1712 0.1652 0.2400 0.3300 0.09803755
23 -0.0500 0.0900 0.1800 0.1717 0.2500 0.3300 0.09821578
Table 7: Model results summary statistics, cluster by cluster.
C: Rho, Vega, derivative with respect to leverage and the joint deriva-
tives
In this paragraph, for exposition reasons, leverage is deﬁned as the ratio between the market
value of straight debt and the market value of the assets together with the franchise value.
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Second joint derivative with respect to both leverage and policy rate:
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Third joint derivative with respect to the policy rate and volatility:
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Second-order derivative with respect to leverage:
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Vomma, second-order derivative with respect to volatility:
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Second-order derivative with respect to the policy rate:
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Chapter 2
Optimal Bank Risk Appetite in a World
of CoCos19
Abstract
We investigate the shape of risk appetite when the bank is ﬁnanced also with con-
tingent convertible bonds (CoCos). Our contribution to the existent literature is to
assess risk appetite in a multi-dimensional perspective and to account for diﬀerences
among banks' clusters, especially in a world with CoCos and policy rates approaching
zero or negative ﬁgures. In our model, the bank objective function is given by the
sum of the default put option and the down-and-out call (DOC) option, pricing the net
present value of growth opportunities. The manager maximizes the market value of the
bank, adjusting jointly the level of leverage, the amount of CoCos to issue, assets and
franchise value volatility and the policy rate. Risk appetite is given by the ﬁrst order
derivatives. Our model and Basel III recommendation converge over their incentives
regarding volatility and leverage. For banks with higher franchise value, it is optimal
to issue an average amount of CoCos (over the market value of the assets) of 3%. A
decrease in volatility accrues to the DOC option, in particular for under capitalized
banks. The optimal policy rate is always higher with respect to the actual one. The
optimal value for the decision variables diﬀers among the clusters. We show that for
the bank, it is always better to issue CoCos with respect to write-down bonds.
Keywords: Contingent Convertible Bonds, risk appetite, franchise value, Basel III.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, G32, G38, E52
19We acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Europlace Institute of Finance (EIF) and the Labex Louis
Bachelier (Grant 2014).
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6 Introduction
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers, governments announced the end of the too big to fail.
In this context, issuing loss absorbing instruments has gained increasing popularity. Between 2009
and 2015, banks issued more than USD380 billion of CoCos 20. Regulation plays a crucial role in
determining CoCos' issuance. Under Basel III, CoCo bonds are eligible as either Additional Tier 1
(AT1) or Tier 2 (T2), which are types of capital apparently preferred by banks with respect to equity
to accomplish regulatory requirements, given that they are cheaper and less dilutive than issuing
equity. Their introduction into the ﬁnancing structure of our banks is relevant from a regulation
and risk management point of view. There is no convergence in the opinions concerning those
instruments mainly due to the uncertainty around their impact and the diﬃculties in understanding
their conversion mechanisms. There are CoCos supporters, like Switzerland's FINMA and Bank
of England, and opponents, such as Deutsche Bank.21 Our analysis is driven by the concerns
economists have regarding the impact of CoCos and WDs on bank risk appetite. Neel Kashkari,
Minneapolis FED's President, warns against instruments like CoCos, suggesting that ..transferring
risk to investors won't protect taxpayers from bailout.22
In this paper, we introduce CoCo bonds in the ﬁnancing structure of our bank and see how the shape
of the bank risk appetite changes. In our model, the manager acts in order to accomplish regulatory
requirements. Focusing on capital requirements, banks, accomplishing to Basel III rule, have to
fund themselves with at least 4.5% of common equity of risk-weighted assets (RWAs). The regulator
allows for an extra 1.5% of Additional Tier 1 (AT1) that together with the Common Equity Tier 1
(CET1) concurs to compose the minimum level of 6% of Tier 1 capital over RWAs. Hence, in order
to be compliant with this ratio, the manager has discretionary power over two variables: CoCos
issuance and assets' volatility. On one side, issuing CoCos, which are eligible for AT1, the manager
increases the numerator of the ratio, enlarging the Tier 1. On the other side, the manager might
decrease the RWAs. RWAs are a weighted sum of banks' assets, weighted for their contribution to the
total assets' volatility. Through this capital requirement ratio, the regulator provides an incentive
for decreasing assets' volatility. In our model, optimizing the level of risk appetite, the manager
should focus on the maximization of the bank objective function, which is given by the sum of the
two options (default put option and down-and-out call (DOC) option). We assess the impact on our
20This amount refer to the face value of the CoCos issued, Data from Moody's Investors Service, Moody's
Quarterly Rated and Tracked CoCo Monitor Database- Year End 2015.
21Financial Times, ECB is having second thoughts on CoCo bonds, 04.24.2016, https :
//www.ft.com/content/23d61e50− 08a7− 11e6− b6d3− 746f8e9cdd33.
22The Wall Street Journal, Fed's Kashkari Says Transferring Risk to Investors Won't Protect Taxpayers
From Bailout, 04.18.2016, http : //www.wsj.com/articles/feds− kashkari− says− transferring− risk−
to− investors− wont− protect− taxpayers− from− bailout− 1460997006.
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objective function of issuing CoCos, in order to enlarge Tier1 capital, for being compliant with the
capital requirement. We concentrate on the situation in which the bank deteriorates over its capital
ratio, as deﬁned in Basel III, and chooses to improve it by either decreasing assets' volatility, through
assets' substitution and a change in the growth opportunities' strategy, or (and) to enlarge its Tier1
capital. The objective function is given by the sum of the two options (default put and DOC), thus
the objective function is increasing with respect to volatility, but the risk to breach the barrier in the
DOC option bounds volatility optimal values. In this context is not always unfavourable a decrease
in volatility, this is what allows us to ﬁnd an optimal value for this variable. In our case, a decrease
in volatility and an increase in Tier 1 Capital favour the DOC option over the default put option.
In the case of assets' deterioration, the decision to issue some instruments in order to improve its
capital ratio, favour the franchise value, since the distance to the franchise barrier is again increased.
This happens for CoCos both before and after the conversion, because before conversion they are
eligible for AT1 and after the conversion they convert to equity concurring to increase CET1. We
ﬁnd that both our model and Basel III recommendation converge over their incentives regarding
volatility and leverage. We show that for banks with higher franchise value it is optimal to issue an
average amount of CoCos over the market value of the assets and the franchise value of 3%. CoCos
do not only enlarge the distance to the default barrier but also to the franchise value's one. The
optimized objective function value with CoCos is always higher than the one without CoCos, this is
true both at aggregate level and in the cluster analysis. On the optimal volatility side, a decrease in
this ﬁgure accrues to the DOC option, in particular for under capitalized banks even if it can't be
pushed too low in order to preserve the default put option. This can be obtained by changing assets'
composition and growth opportunities strategies. The other optimizing decision variables are crucial
in shaping risk appetite and help in understanding the diﬀerences among the clusters. We do not
diﬀerentiate before conversion between write down bonds and CoCos but only afterwards. In this
context, it is always optimal to have a conversion ratio greater than zero, even if loss absorbing, thus,
smaller than one, for ensuring compliance with Basel III. Our contribution to the existent literature
is to assess risk appetite in a multi-dimensional perspective and to account for diﬀerences among
banks' clusters which are even more relevant in a world with CoCos and policy rates approaching
zero or negative ﬁgures, in a Basel III friendly framework.
7 Literature review
Our paper is mainly related to three diﬀerent strands of the literature. First, the building blocks
are the seminal works by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973a), where the liabilities of a
company are seen as an European option written on the assets of a ﬁrm. In this context, we assess
46
the market value of equity building on Babbel and Merrill (2005). They introduce the concept that
the franchise value, together with the default put option accrue to equity holders Barone-Adesi et al.
(2014) argue that the risk appetite of banks is determined by the interplay of default put option
and growth opportunities, assessed with a DOC option.In this domain, we contribute to the existent
literature providing a three-dimensional framework for assessing risk appetite. We supply a superior
understanding of the joint impact of the three optimizing variables (leverage, assets and franchise
value volatility, and policy rate) have on each other and on the bank risk appetite. Our study takes
into account Brockman and Turtle (2003), who show that equity can be knocked out whenever a
legally binding barrier is breached, even if we look at this work for the pricing of our franchise value.
Second, a relevant issue for our model is the impact Basel III has on our bank's deﬁnition of risk
appetite. The impact of the key instruments of Basel III is widely analysed by Hugonnier and Morel-
lec (2017), proposing a dynamic model of banking. They ﬁnd that leverage requirements decrease
default risk and increase growth opportunities of the bank, on the long-run, which is in line with
our ﬁndings. Another key point is that, raising equity requirements make the loss to be borne by
shareholders and the distance to default increases (see e.g. Admati and Hellwig (2013)), we mitigate
this counter eﬀect by considering the issue of loss absorbing CoCos with respect to equity.
Third, we refer also to the literature of hybrid capital. An interesting literature review of the basics
of this instruments is given in De Spiegeleer et al. (2014). A relevant part of the literature focuses
on credit spreads, e.g. Attaoui and Poncet (2015) develop the model showing that credit spread on
straight debt is lower if the ﬁrm has write-down (WD) bonds in its ﬁnancing structure, given the
cushion function of the WDs with respect to the senior straight debt. CoCos are nearer to equity
because in some states of the world they are not debt. Chen et al. (2013) show that replacing
some straight debt with CoCos lowers the endogenous default barrier and therefore increases the
ﬁrm's ability to mitigate a loss in asset value. A natural direction for future research is to consider
the impact of wealth transfer among diﬀerent categories of stakeholders, which should be relevant
for governments. Roy and El-Herraoui (2016) demonstrate the complexity of designing a fair and
eﬀective bail-in regime. The regulator is mainly confronted with the choice of implementing or not
the wealth transfer. If it chooses to do so, it faces the risk of requests for compensation and ar-
bitrage behaviour in ﬁnancial markets. Our results show that banks with great positive franchise
value would beneﬁt from the inclusion of CoCos in the capital structure, and together with a low
volatility and an appropriate optimal discounting rate, ensuring stability, the market value of the
bank would be magniﬁed over standard ﬁnancing. This ﬁndings add to the existent literature which
provides controversial results with respect to those instruments. We prove that those hybrid instru-
ments increase the bank market value, saving its growth opportunities, when they are appropriately
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counterbalanced with relative low volatility values and relative high policy rates23.
8 The model
The subject of our study is the risk appetite of a bank held by shareholders who beneﬁt from limited
liability and who bear the down-side of a potential loss together with the CoCo holders. They
discount cash ﬂows at a constant interest rate.
The structure of the balance sheet, in book values, is given as follows. The bank owns a portfolio
of risky assets and liquid reserves, and is ﬁnanced by insured deposits, risky debt, CoCos and equity.
At this stage we do not diﬀerentiate between CoCo bonds and WDs, because we consider only loss-
absorbing CoCos. On the left hand side of the balance sheet, risky assets are relative illiquid due to
informational problems (see e.g. Hugonnier and Morellec (2017) and Froot and Stein (1998).
Going to market values, debt is seen as a portfolio of cash plus a short position in a put option
on ﬁrm value as in Merton (1974) and equity as a call option on assets as in Black and Scholes
(1973). In our model, we focus on the interplay between the default put (PUT def ) option and the
down-and-out call (DOC) option that accrue to shareholders, pricing the net present value of growth
opportunities, i.e. the franchise value.
8.1 Main assumptions and model description
We introduce the main assumptions of our model, building on the seminal work of Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974), and the following intuitions of Babbel and Merrill (2005) and Barone-
Adesi et al. (2014).
We operate in continuous time, with initial date t = 0 and terminal date t = T . The usual
assumptions regarding standard frictions are considered: we do not contemplate transaction costs,
taxes24, costs of raising funds, limits on short sales and riskless arbitrage opportunities. Agents are
risk-neutral and conﬂicts of interest between shareholders, managers and CoCo holders is not a topic
of this paper25. The focus of the project is to understand how the regulator should set appropriate
risk-taking incentives in a framework where the manager has to deal together with the default put
option and the DOC one. Hence, in the Optimization Problem section, we propose the objective
23Overall the results over the policy rates are free from considerations dealing with inﬂation, other macroe-
conomic variables and a number of factors, usually taken into account by the monetary policy. In our paper
we obtain the ideal optimal discount rate, ensuring stability, given that it is determined by the interplay of
the two options which display opposite sensitivities with respect to the policy rate.
24We brieﬂy relax this assumption, assessing directions of future development of this model in the extensions
section
25Again, extensions are very interesting in this domain.
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function to be maximized as the sum of the two options, normalized by the market value of the
assets, representing at that stage a neutral scaling value. Initially, shareholders contribute the entire
equity of the bank and, subsequently, consider operating a debt-equity swap at t0. The proceeds
from debt issue are invested in the assets in place and future growth opportunities that at time T
are worth A (T ) and Fr (T ), respectively26.
The default can occur only at the end of the period, T , in case liabilities exceed assets. We
deﬁne the market value of the total exposure, MVA, as the sum of the value of the tangible assets
and the franchise value, subsuming the future growth opportunities of the bank. The value of the
total exposure at time t is given by:
MVA (t) = MVA (0) exp
(
µMVAt −
σ2MVA
2
t+ σMVABt
)
, (21)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion deﬁned on (Ω,F , Q), so that, their dynamic is:
d ln (MVA (t)) =
(
µMVAt −
σ2MVA
2
t
)
dt+ σMVAdBt, (22)
where the drift, µt, is time-varying and σ is constant and both are referred to the sum of the tangible
value of the assets and the franchise value. For simplicity, we ﬁx the risk-free rate and dividend
issues equal to zero27. Similar to Babbel and Merril (2005) and Barone-Adesi, Farkas and Medina
(2014), we split the value of the bank into three components. First, considering the limited liability,
the market value of the equity of our bank is a call option on the assets:
E(T ) := max(A(T )− L), (23)
where A is the value of the banks'assets and L the face value of the liabilities. Second, let's split
the value of equity into the following two components:
E(T ) := X(T ) + Putdef (T ), (24)
where X(T ) := A(T ) − L is the net tangible value of the bank, without considering the limited
liability, which is represented through the default put option. Third, we allow the bank to be able
26We consider as future growth opportunities not only the potential increase in credits, but all the chances
the bank has to open new lines of business, to enter new markets and more in general all the potential results
due to research and development.
27In the next subsections, we relax the assumption regarding the policy rate, allowing it to be diﬀerent
from zero, instead the assumption concerning the dividend yield is a topic considered in the extension as an
interesting variable to take into account when comparing an issue of CoCos issue with an equity one.
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to invest in value creating opportunities at time T, through the introduction of the franchise value
(Fr(T )). Hence,
E(T ) := X(T ) + Putdef (T ) + Fr(T ). (25)
Future growth opportunities materialize only at the end of the period, T , being Fr (T ) but the
franchise, which is the net present value of future growth opportunities value might vanish previously,
as soon as the liabilities exceeds the asset value in 0 ≤ t ≤ T , that is when
τFr=0 = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : A (t) ≤ FV SD +Dep} , (26)
where, A are the assets in place, FV SD the face value of the straight debt and Dep the value of
deposits. Our franchise value barrier is higher with respect to Demsetz et al. (1996) or Jones et al.
(2011), because in their model this value is lost in case of bankruptcy. In our model, the ability
of the ﬁrm to engage in new projects, leading to growth opportunities, may be impaired if it is
perceived that the bank is experiencing a weak ﬁnancial position. Some further assumptions have to
be considered, because in this framework, CoCo bonds are introduced in the ﬁnancing structure. At
t = 0, the bank issues also CoCo bonds eligible for Additional Tier 1 (AT1), with inﬁnite maturity,
conforming to Basel III regulation. In contrast to straight debt, that is a zero coupon, CoCo bonds
pay a coupon cCoCo > 0 and conversion from debt to equity is triggered when the value of the ﬁrm's
assets fall below an exogenously speciﬁed threshold VConv. This trigger is set larger than the face
value of the standard debt, so that FV SD < VConv < A (t). Consequently, CoCos conversion occurs
at
τConv = inf {t ≥ 0 : A (t) ≤ VConv} .
This implies that the optimal bankruptcy level does not depend on the conversion trigger, because
it is a post-conversion threshold. This is relevant especially in case bankruptcy is determined
endogenously, which is not the case in this model, since we rely on Basel recommendations28. In
our model, CoCos could qualify only as AT1, under Basel III, as explained by Avdjiev et al. (2013),
so that they operate in favour to franchise value as explained in the next paragraph. It means that
the CoCos' threshold is higher with respect to the franchise barrier, because we consider that banks
having converted CoCos still have some growth opportunities at stake. Both CoCos and franchise
threshold are obviously higher with respect to bankruptcy one. The overall value for CoCo's holder
is given by the sum of the face value plus the coupon payment, cCoCo > 0, if the conversion is
28It would be considered in an extension in order to assess whether bank's choice would be aligned with
regulation or would behave diﬀerently.
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not taking place before T and the fraction of shares, 4EτConv , CoCo holders receive, becoming
shareholders in case of conversion, as identiﬁed in Alvemar and Ericson (2012):
V CoCoT = FV
CoCo1{τConv>T} + c
CoCo1{t<τConv} +4EτConv1{τConv≤T}.
This relation is evaluated at time T , except for the CoCos' coupon, that is due until conversion
takes place. At conversion in presence of CoCos, shareholders receive a fraction of shares 4EτConv ,
so that the value of the overall equity increases by such an amount. In our model, we focus only
on loss-absorbing CoCos, meaning that delta is between zero and one (0 < 4 < 1). When it is
exactly equal to zero, the banks issues a write-down bonds, that is a contingent convertible bond
converting to zero in case of a trigger event. Being in the context of banks that could consider a
CoCos' issuance, we focus on Tier 1, rather than the end of the period equity market value. Thus,
the end of the period Tier 1, for any t = 0, ..., T is:
T ier1(T )=
 A(T )−Dep−FV SD(T )+Fr(T )+Putdef (T ) if MV A(t)≥(SD(t)+Dep(t))
(SD(T )+Dep(T ))−A(T ) if MV A(t)<(L(t)+D(t))
. (27)
We assume that the bank can default only at time t = T , but the franchise value might vanish
before, as soon as the liabilities exceed the assets at any time between t = 0 and t = T . From this
speciﬁcation, we can easily understand that the main variables that determine the Tier 1 at the end
of the period are the franchise value and the default put option. Hence, we deﬁne the objective
function at time t, as the sum of the down-and-out call option and the default put option. We
present the optimization procedure in the next sections.
In the expressions above, we show that the franchise value come to fruition in case the tangible
value of the assets do not fall below the value of the total liabilities, considering also deposits.
Furthermore, in case the franchise value is positive we have a ﬁrst intuition regarding the superiority
of the DOC option over the default put one, since the put option would be out of the money. Thus
the shareholders do not exercise the put option and its present value would still be given by the
option price that can be potentially exercised in the future. The opposite is true when the tangible
value of the assets is eroded.
8.2 Pricing the default option in presence of CoCos
Bank shareholders are long on the default option, which the manager has to maximize acting on
the behalf of the shareholders, as in Barone-Adesi et al. (2014). We propose a slight modiﬁcation
in the pricing formula of the default put option. We introduce also the franchise value Fr as
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underlying together with the standard market value of the assets MVA. This is necessary in order
to prevent potential arbitrage opportunities, that could arise otherwise, buying the bank and selling
short the tangible assets and the franchise value, if this last one would not be considered. Another
major diﬀerence with standard literature deals with volatility which remains the volatility of the
underlying, but in our case the underlying is jointly given by the market value of the assets and the
franchise value(σMVA). Furthermore, introducing the CoCos in the ﬁnancing, impairs the power of
straight debt in stimulating the shareholders to opt for default. We account for them in leverage,
i.e. lev, which is given by the ratio between the Tier1 and the sum of the market value of the assets
and franchise value, following Basel III deﬁnition, which impose the ratio to be evaluated over the
total exposure. In this case, CoCos accrue to the Tier1, being eligible for AT1.The strike price is
the market value for straight debt and deposits, MV SD +Dep 29. T is the time to maturity and rf
is the policy rate. Our pricing for the default put option is given by:
Putdef (lev, σMVA, rf) =
(
MV SD +Dep
)
Φ (−d2) +
(− (MVA) Φ (−d1)) ,
with {τFr=0 > T},
where d1 =
 ln( 11−lev )+(rf+σ2MVA2 )T
σMVA
√
T
 ,
lev =
(
T ier1
MVA
)
, d2 = d1 − σMVA
√
T ,Φ− standardNormal
(28)
We consider without loss of generality Φ the standard Normal. In absence of growth opportunities
and CoCos, the pricing formula goes back to the standard one. At a ﬁrst glance, the standard greeks
for this option are given as follows:
Sensitivity to leverage :
[
δPutdefi,t
δlevi,t
]
< 0
Sensitivity to volatility :
[
δPutdefi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to policy − rate :
[
δPutdefi,t
δrfi,t
]
< 0
(29)
29We proxy the market value for the straight debt with the KMV model (KMV corporation).
52
The default put option is increasing in volatility and decreasing in leverage, deﬁned as above, and the
policy rate. This option push the bank manager to adopt a risk-taking policy, but this is mitigated,
with respect to standard case, by the presence of the franchise value and CoCos, when we control
also for volatility and the policy rate, as we show in the results section.
8.3 Pricing the DOC option, in presence of non-observable under-
lying and CoCos
We refer to the portfolio of growth opportunities at time T as F (T ). Before maturity, the expected
value of Fr(T ) is not observable and embedded in the market value of the bank. At the beginning
of the period, before observing the Fr(T ), we can price this portfolio of growth opportunities in the
option framework (see for the basic ﬁnancing the one proposed in Barone-Adesi et al. (2014)). The
DOC is a down and out call option, with a pricing formula whose underlying is the franchise value
net of investment cost in the case the bank does not opt for default. Since investment costs are
already considered in the franchise value, the strike price for this option is set to zero. The barrier is
given by the sum of the market value of standard senior debt and deposits. This option is priced in
an European framework given that the franchise value comes to fruition only at maturity30, but it is
path dependent. In case the barrier is breached before maturity the option expires and the franchise
value is driven immediately to zero. Taking into account the CoCos in the ﬁnancing framework,
we notice that with respect to a context with standard ﬁnancing the distance to the barrier for
franchise value is enlarged, both before and after conversion. This is true because before conversion
CoCos accrue to Tier1 being eligible for AT1 and after conversion they become equity or nothing
(depending on the conversion ratio), accruing to Tier1 directly being part of CET1. The pricing is
given as follows:
DOC (lev, σMVA, rf) = Fr [Φ (v1) +
− (1− lev)2λ Φ (y1)
]
with {τFr=0 > T} ,
where λ =
rf+
σ2MVA
2
σ2MVA
v1 =
ln( 11−lev )
σMVA
√
T
+ λσMVA
√
T , y1 =
ln(1−lev)
σMVA
√
T
+ λσMVA
√
T
(30)
30That is equivalent to say that we can exercise it only at maturity.
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This pricing formula is not applicable directly in an empirical context because the franchise value,
as well as the market value of the assets and their volatility are not directly observable in the market,
but we provide our model in order to estimate them in a framework considering the two options
presented. We provide the standard greeks also for this option, in the context of the presence
of CoCos in the ﬁnancing structure of the bank which are considered in the leverage variable.
Accordingly to the existent literature, the DOC option is increasing in volatility and in the policy
rate. With respect to volatility we show in the empirical application that both at aggregate level and
in the cluster analysis, we relation is increasing but bounded. Hence, the numerical optimization
procedure, we propose in the following sections, reach the optimum in presence of relative low values
for volatility. This happens because of the higher probability, in case of relative higher value of this
variable, to breach the barrier and thus to set to zero the value of the franchise value. The "greek"
with respect to leverage is non standard in the literature. We ﬁnd it to be positive for the DOC
option because, given the Basel III deﬁnition of leverage, a greater value of leverage increase the
distance to the franchise value barrier. The results are given below:
Sensitivity to leverage :
[
δDOCi,t
δlevi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to volatility :
[
δDOCi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
≶ 0
Sensitivity to policy − rate :
[
δDOCi,t
δrfi,t
]
> 0
(31)
The default put option is increasing in volatility and decreasing in leverage, deﬁned as above, and
the policy rate. We show in the following sections when the DOC prevails over the default put one
in determing the shape of the objective function and consequently the one of risk appetite.
9 The optimization problem for risk appetite
In standard literature, we commonly refer to risk appetite as an assessment of the riskiness of the
assets in the bank portfolio. The regulator, through the capital ratio proposed in Basel III, considers
also the joint eﬀect of volatility together with the amount of Tier1 at stake, that we can translate
in our model into our leverage variable. We propose to go a step further, assessing the joint impact
of these ﬁrst two variables together with an ideal policy rate31 which is determined by the interplay
of the two options, driving our objective function. This rate is an ideal candidate ensuring stability
between the opposite forces a bank decision maker has to face when shaping risk appetite. In our
31In the paper we refer to the policy rate or to the discount rate indiscriminately.
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model we concentrate on the maximization of the market value of equity of the bank. From the
relations exposed above, we know that the key determinants of the market value are the default
put and the DOC option. The two options provide diﬀerent incentives concerning the variables
taken into account for understanding our three-dimensional risk appetite, which are leverage, assets
and franchise value volatility and the policy rate. Following our reasoning, we deﬁne the objective
function (O.f.) as the sum of the two options:
O.f.i,t := DOC
(
levi,t, σMVAi,t , rfi,t
)
+ PUT def
(
levi,t, σMVAi,t , rfi,t
)
. (32)
We propose this deﬁnition for the objective function because we propose a speciﬁcation of the
market value of the bank which is determined by the sum of the two options and is consequently
driven by our decision variables (leverage, volatility and the policy rate)32. The bank manager has
decision power over the ﬁrst two variables, instead the we examine only the impact of an ideal
candidate for the third one. The regulator on her side, should take into account this perspective in
order to better understand banks' strategy and to set the appropriate incentives in its regulation
framework. The risk appetite is determined in the optimization problem we present in Section 2.2
and is given by the ﬁrst order derivatives and the determinant of the Hessian matrix.
The optimization problem is twofold. In the ﬁrst step we estimate the franchise value and the
market value of the assets that are not observable in the market, but are embedded in the equity
market value. Those elements are necessary inputs to perform the second optimization, where we
look for the optimal level of leverage, and consequently the optimal amount of CoCos to issue, the
assets and franchise value volatility and the policy rate that simultaneously optimize the objective
function.
9.1 First step ingredients
In the ﬁrst step, the goal is to estimate the unobservable franchise value and the market value of
the assets that are embedded in the equity market value. By put-call parity, we establish this ﬁrst
system of equations:
We solve the following system of equation simultaneously:
32In the section "Main assumptions and model description" and in the "First step ingredients" of the
optimization problem we display how we determine the market value of the equity and thus the motivation
of our objective function.
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
MVEi,t= (Ai,t−(MV SD+Dep)i,t+DOCi,t+Putdefi,t ),
σMVEi,tMVEi,t= σMVAi,t (MVAi,t)Φ(d1i,t),
where d1i,t =
 ln
(
MVAi,t
(MV SD+Dep)i,t
)
+
(
rfi,t+
σ2MVAi,t
2
)
T
σMVAi,t
√
T
 .
(33)
In the ﬁrst equation,
(
MV SD +Dep
)
is the market value of the sum of the market value of the
straight debt and deposits, considering in this ﬁrst element the value of the total amount of both
short term and long term liabilities. This extension of the Merton speciﬁcation allows us to
consider the franchise value both at the underlying and implied volatility level. We base our
analysis on the intuition that the equity market value incorporates the information regarding both
the assets market value and the franchise value, consequently the implied volatility estimated in
this model refers to the one considering both the assets and the franchise value. The manager
performs her analysis at the beginning of the period, when the franchise value is considerable only
through the pricing relation of the DOC option33. We solve this problem through the non-linear
least squares criterion function, for each bank at any time t on the whole time span considered. We
minimize the distance between the data concerning the equity market value and the model
extended accommodating for both the default put option and the DOC one. We perform a step by
step optimization for Θi,t := Fri,t, Ai,t, σMVAi,t , building on the Bellman's Principle of Optimality
(Bellman (1952)), applied also in Merton (1973b). We build on the following error function:
 e1,i,t= MVEi,t−(Ai,t−(MV SD+Dep)i,t+DOC(Θi,t)+Putdef (Θi,t)),
e2,i,t= σMVEi,tMVEi,t−σMVAi,tMVAi,tΦ(d1i,t),
(34)
where {i}n1 is the bank identiﬁcator and {t}m1 the year considered. The non linear least square
function is the following:
Θ∗i,t = argmin
∑2,n,m
j,i,t=1
[
e2j,i,t
]
(Θi,t)
(35)
where the solution value is Θ∗i,t, which is the non-linear least squares estimators, optimizing the
sum of the squared deviations. Hence, the needed inputs to perform the subsequent
optimization34. At this step, empirically, we proceed in our ﬁrst clustering distinguishing among
banks with franchise value and without.
33Given that the franchise value Fr comes to fruition only at time T .
34As we explain in the following step, we perform the optimization at each time step t, following Bellman
(1952) and Merton (1973b), in order to allow the franchise value of the bank to come to fruition at time T .
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9.2 Second step
This is the central step of our optimization procedure. The key determinants of our objective function
are leverage, assets and franchise value volatility and the policy rate. Thus, it would be simplistic to
focus only on one dimension when considering the risk appetite of a bank. Furthermore, we will see
that empirically there are major diﬀerences among banks' clusters. Hence a ﬂat regulation, "one size
ﬁts all", is not convenient for neither the regulator nor the bank itself. In addition, we underline that
the policy rate have an impact in the pricing of the two options at stake, even if the magnitudo of this
variable is relatively small compared to the ﬁrst two35. The strength of this paper is to consider these
three dimensions and to derive a three dimensional risk appetite deﬁnition. Introducing the franchise
value, we go beyond standard literature and regulation. In our model, the franchise value, gives the
shape to the objective function together with the well known default put option36. The third key
element for understanding the following relation is given by the bank's ﬁnancing, including also the
CoCo bonds. Accordingly to this perspective, the manager has to optimize the objective function of
the bank, modifying its exposure to risky assets and changing (even if only in part, given the nature
of a portfolio of growth opportunity that materializes only at T ) the strategy concerning the growth
opportunity portfolio(short-term - being a stepwise optimization)and adjusting bank's leverage at
time zero, operating always for allowing the franchise value to come to fruition at time T . The shape
of risk appetite is assessed through the determinant of the Hessian matrix in a three-dimensional
perspective. We propose a volatility-driven risk appetite, as well as a leverage-driven one and a policy
rate-driven one. The cluster analysis adds information, helping in the understanding of which option
determines the shape of risk appetite. This element could be crucial for a more eﬃcient regulation,
which for the while diﬀerentiate only between systemically important ﬁnancial institution and the
rest of the banks. A priori, the sensitivity analysis of each option's value with respect to the variables
at stake and we reported those results in the previous section. Overall, what is the impact of each
variable marginal changes on the whole objective function in presence of franchise value and CoCos?
In our framework, there is not a monetary policy maker contribution, but we assess the optimal
policy rate for stability. Thus, we analyse the sensitivity of the objective function with respect to
the policy rate (policy rate-driven risk appetite), setting rho equal to zero. The decision variables
over which, instead, the manager has discretionary power at time zero are volatility and leverage.
On the bank manager side, the shape of risk appetite is determined evaluating at zero both vega
(volatility-driven risk appetite) and the ﬁrst order derivative with respect to the leverage (leverage-
35In the empirical analysis we show sensitivity results concerning this intuition. An extension to this work
would consider a quantiﬁcation of the magnitudo each variable over the objective function.
36In our model the default put option is peculiar having as underlying the franchise value as well and with
the presence of the CoCos in the ﬁnancing of the bank.
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driven risk appetite) 37. The optimization variables are the leverage, the assets and franchise value
volatility and the policy rate, so our theta in this case is: Θi,t :=
(
levi,t, σMVAi,t , rfi,t
)
. When the
franchise value is available, the optimization problem is:
Θ∗i,t =
argmax
Θi,t
[Ofi,t] (36)
In this framework our three-dimensional risk appetite (R.A.) is given by:
leverage− driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δlevi,t
]
= 0 |σ∗MVAi,t ,rf∗i,t
volatility − driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
= 0 |lev∗i,t,rf∗i,t
policy − rate− driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δrfi,t
]
= 0 |lev∗i,t,σ∗MVAi,t
(37)
We perform a simultaneous optimization over the three variables, hence we express the ﬁrst order
partial derivatives of each single variable given the optimal ﬁgures of the other two. We accommodate
for a joint optimization, which helps us to go beyond the single impact of each variable, stressing
the importance of taking into account the joint eﬀect of them over the objective function. We deﬁne
our optimal value of CoCos to issue per bank per year as:
CoCoi,t :=
(
lev∗i,t − levacti,t
)
, (38)
where levacti,t is the actual level of leverage in Basel terms and lev
∗
i,t is the optimal level derived in the
optimization process, when the optimal level is above the actual one, otherwise we do not have an
issue of CoCos. This is straightforward because the optimal leverage if greater than the actual one
enlarges the Tier1 and this can be done either through an issue of equity, which is never optimal (we
discuss this in the extensions), or through an issue of CoCos eligible for AT1, with a loss absorbing
conversion ratio, i.e. a conversion ratio (that we call delta) smaller than one. If the conversion ratio
is equal to zero, the CoCo bonds is a write down bond converting to zero, otherwise it is a proper
CoCo bond. Numerically, we use the methodology developed by Byrd et al. (1995) allowing us to
give lower and upper bounds for each variable (box constraints), whose initial value must satisfy the
constraint. This uses a limited-memory modiﬁcation of the BFGS quasi-Newton method (Broyden
(1970); Fletcher (1970); Goldfarb (1970); Shanno (1970)) and in our procedure, the algorithm always
37In standard literature, it does not exist a "greek letter" identifying the sensitivity of an option price with
respect to leverage.
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achieve the ﬁnite convergence.
We perform a pointwise optimization since we are interested in the optimal values of the pa-
rameters for each bank on the whole time span. Our objective function is given by the sum of our
two options, but we prefer to assess its shape considering the market value of the assets as our
normalizing variable. In this optimization step, the market value of the assets is an input derived
in the ﬁrst step, thus our variables are totally neutral to this scaling ﬁgure. In this context, the
optimal objective function do not have theoretical bounds, but we focus on 0 ≤ O.f.i,t ≤ 1, since it
is hard to ﬁnd empirically a bank having the sum of the two options greater than the market value
of the assets (our normalizing quantity).
9.3 A sensitivity analysis of the objective function
In the literature, we ﬁnd plenty of studies concerning the greeks of the options we consider in our
model. Nevertheless, given the speciﬁcation we give to the DOC option and the introduction in the
leverage ﬁgure of the CoCos, we give in the appendix the derivation of both the ﬁrst order derivatives
and the components of the Hessian matrix. For a better understanding of the empirical results of
our model, we perform in the subsequent appendix a simulation for a better understanding of the
optimal solutions of our objective function. The simulation is performed letting one variable free
and setting the other two on average cluster input values. Given our deﬁnition of leverage, i.e. the
ratio between Tier1 and the market value of the assets and franchise value, the sign of the ﬁrst
order derivative of the objective function with respect to leverage is positive if we consider only
the case where the franchise value is positive. This is true because in this case the DOC option
dominates over the default put one and this is favoured with a higher distance to the barrier for
the franchise value. If we consider the policy rate, the two options display diﬀerent sensitivities and
the greeks display opposite signs. For these two variables, it is straightforward to ﬁnd an optimum
for our speciﬁcation of objective function. This is not so obvious for volatility. At a ﬁrst glance,
considering an option framework, it is demanding to perceive that we can ﬁnd an optimal solution
for our volatility variable. On one side, the default put option is strictly increasing in volatility, but
on the other side, the down-and-out call option is increasing in volatility for relative small values, but
it is decreasing for larger values of this variable. This is the case because for relative higher values
of volatility, there is an increasing probability to touch the barrier of our DOC, thus to drop to zero
its value. This is the reason why we ﬁnd relative low optimal volatility values. Summing up, for
relative lower values both the options are increasing in volatility, but for relative higher values, the
DOC option prevails over the default put one and the whole objective function exhibits a decreasing
shape. Hence, we can ﬁnd an optimal solution also for volatility.
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10 Results
We implement our model on a dataset consisting of 1436 US banks, whose sample period is 1980-
2014 . This is of particular interest because no US banks issued CoCos up to 2014, thus we show
for which banks it would have been optimal to issue CoCos and for which not and the impact this
choice, together with the others decision variables, have on the franchise value and on the objective
function of the banks assessed. Balance sheet items are taken from COMPUSTAT and considered
on an annual basis. Market prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Price
data are taken on a monthly basis to accommodate the constant volatility hypothesis. We perform
our optimizations with several initial values in order to check we have results numerically stable.
10.1 Bridging our model to Basel III recommendations
Our optimization procedure leads us to the following results. First, in Figure 5 we show that
the optimal volatility is below the actual embedded one. We obtain the assets' and franchise's
volatility from the second step of our optimization procedure. The distance between the two ﬁgures
enlarges in the years after 2008 relative to the rest of the time series. The rational for decreasing
volatility following the incentive of the capital ratio (Tier1 over RWAs), where we proxy RWAs for
assets' and franchise's value volatility, is also motivated by our model results. We ﬁnd that optimal
volatility is always smaller than the volatility embedded in the market value. We demonstrate that
the objective function, being determined by two options, is an increasing function of volatility, but
optimal values are bounded in a relative low environment. This is important in order to preserve the
franchise value which can be destroyed with high volatility given the higher probability of hitting
the franchise barrier.
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Figure 5: Embedded versus optimal volatility.
Second, we show that optimal leverage is above the actual one. We can see that the distance
between the actual level and the optimal one increases substantially when the crisis of 2008 exploded.
The leverage is expressed in Basel regulation terms, meaning that at the numerator we have Tier1
which has to be increased following both our model, considering the two options, and Basel rule. The
enlargement of the Tier1 promotes the DOC option and helps maintaining the franchise value also
during bad times, where in general we might expect an erosion of the growth opportunities of the
bank. The regulation do not consider the franchise value and banks growth but in this case gives an
aligned incentive. We have two ways for increasing Tier1. From one side, the bank can issue equity;
on the other side it might opt for issuing hybrid capital eligible for AT1, i.e. CoCo bonds with a loss
absorbing conversion ratio. We consider in the extension paragraph some pitfalls related to the issue
of equity in comparison to the issue of CoCos. Issuing equity should not be optimal for both the
pecking order theory, which is even more true during bad times, and for the consequences directly
related to our model, dealing with discretionary coupon savings, which is greater with respect to
discretionary dividends savings and the opportunity given by the tax shield. This last element is
one of the main reasons why in the US banks do not issue CoCos even if we show that it should be
optimal. On the other side, the ﬁscal regulation in Europe allow for tax shield also of this hybrid
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capital, thus we can see empirically an increasing market for CoCos after LLOYDs 2009 ﬁrst issue.
The following graph, Figure 6, represents the amount of leverage of the banks considered in our
sample and is given by the ratio between Tier1 and the total exposure. In our model we consider as
total exposure the franchise value together with the assets. This element is one of the characteristic
of our model. Thus, considering also the franchise value, the banks assessed present a median yearly
leverage well above Basel III recommendation (3%).
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Figure 6: Actual versus optimal leverage in Basel III terms.
We conclude that the results of our model considering the decision variables over which the
manager has discretionary power are in line with Basel III recommendations concerning both the
leverage ratio and the capital ratio. We further propose how to understand banks potential optimal
quantities of CoCos to issue and the impact an ideal optimal policy rate has over the banks' objective
function.
10.2 Empirical results at aggregate level
In this subsection we present the main results at aggregate level. In Figure 7, we show the optimal
average percentage amount of CoCos to issue per year. We obtain this ﬁgure as an output of our
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optimization procedure and it is expressed in percentage terms with respect to the market value of
the assets and franchise value. Interestingly, we ﬁnd a sharp increase in the last period assessed
from 2007 on, starting a year before the boost of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, leading to Basel III.
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Figure 7: Optimal amount of CoCos over the market value of the assets and franchise value
to issue per year.
From now on, we do consider only banks with franchise value, cluster2, instead it is not interesting
for our model to consider the banks without it. Indeed, cluster1 comprehends the banks for which
the franchise value is equal to zero and, in this case, the only determinant in the optimization
procedure is the default put option. We further distinguish between other two sub clusters, the ﬁrst
one where it is optimal to issue CoCos, cluster2a, and the one for which is not optimal to issue
CoCos, cluster2b. In the appendix, we display the summary statistics of the key ﬁgures for both
the clusters in table 11 and table 12 as well as the related conﬁdence intervals for the optimized
variables. In Figure 8, we show a comparison of the objective function with and without CoCos.
The objective function of the cluster for which is optimal to issue CoCos is always above the one
of the cluster for which is not optimal to issue further hybrid capital enlarging Tier1. For both
the clusters, the franchise value is greater than zero, thus the default put option incentives are
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counterbalanced by the DOC option. On one side, the sub sample for which is not optimal to issue
CoCos, i.e. cluster2b, has relative lower optimal volatility and higher policy rate, this two factors
are even more depressing the default put option, which pull down the whole optimized objective
function. On the other side, the sub sample for which is optimal to issue CoCos, i.e. cluster2a,
promotes heavily the DOC option, but thanks to a relative higher volatility and lower policy rate it
maintains also the default put option value. Overall, the optimal amount of CoCos to issue is not
that large with respect to total leverage and this is consistent with regulators' recommendation.
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Figure 8: A comparison of the objective function with and without CoCos.
However, the DOC option is the one which drives upwards the objective function, sustained by the
higher optimal leverage, which is enlarged by the CoCos issued.
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DOC options'value over MVA
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Figure 9: A comparison of the DOC option over MVA with and without CoCos.
In the context of a cluster analysis, cluster 2a is characterized by a higher franchise value, optimal
volatility and leverage but lower policy rate relative to the cluster 2b. We argue that in the cluster
2a, enlarging the Tier1 through an average issue of CoCos of 5% in the US (or 3% in Europe), the
DOC option is promoted over the default put option. We argue this is a ﬁrst reason why in this
cluster the average optimal volatility is relative higher (even if the median ﬁgure is aligned with the
one in cluster 2b) and the optimal policy rate is relative lower. The optimal policy rate ﬁgure does
not consider the inﬂation and other macro issues.
10.3 Empirical results cluster by cluster
In the following paragraphs we assess what happens when we further apply cluster analysis to our
data by leverage obtaining the following clusters: 2a1, 2a2, 2a3 and 2b1, 2b2, 2b3. Cluster 2a1
(or 2b1) have the highest capitalization, thus the largest Tier1 and represent our over capitalized
clusters for which is optimal to issue (or not) CoCos, instead cluster 2a3 (or 2b3) have the lowest
one, being our undercapitalized clusters. The clustering is deﬁned on the basis of actual leverage in
Basel terms, considering from one side the Tier1 ﬁgure reported by the banks, on the other side the
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total exposure given by the market value of the assets and franchise value obtained in the ﬁrst step
of the optimization procedure. Hence we show in the following table the value for leverage of our
clusters.
Table 8: Leverage ﬁgures, cluster analysis.
Clusters 1 2 3
2a 0.1257 0.0850 0.0507
2b 0.1231 0.0872 0.0613
Aggregate 0.1112 0.0741 0.0429
This table shows us a relevant issue for the regulator. Taking into account the franchise value, at
the aggregate level the under capitalized cluster is truly under capitalized for US regulation because
leverage is below 5%,we show it to be almost 4.3%. This is corroborating our model results for the
cluster 2a for which it is optimal to issue CoCos. In the next ﬁgure we show the optimal amount of
CoCos to issue cluster by cluster. After 2000, this ﬁgure moves in the same direction for all the three
clusters a part from the last year considered where the estimates diverge a lot where the average
capitalized cluster demands the highest quantity of CoCos. Over the whole time span considered,
the largest swings are present in cluster2a3, which is the under capitalized cluster. In particular, we
show that right before the last ﬁnancial crisis, it would have been optimal to issue CoCos for those
under capitalized banks. It is only in the last year considered that they increase the Tier1 and we
derive in our model an embedded market value of the assets and franchise value lower with respect
to previous times38.
38More on this in ﬁgure 13 presented in the appendix.
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Figure 10: Optimal amount of CoCos over the market value of the assets and franchise value
to issue per year, cluster by cluster.
Overall we notice that in the clusters for which is optimal to issue CoCos, going from the most
capitalized cluster to the least one, the amount of franchise value increases, the optimal volatility
decreases and the policy rate decreases as well. In example, the most under capitalized cluster would
favour the default put option more with respect to the other two, because of the nature itself of the
cluster. Thus, in order to maintain the franchise value and to promote it, given that the DOC is part
of the optimization procedure, the other decision variables optimally adapt to preserve the overall
optimized value of the whole objective function. Another relevant result is that the average optimal
amount of leverage do not change on average, but diﬀerences emerges considering median optimal
results, even if this variation is not so important with respect to the change in the other variables.
Hence, we underline through these results that even if the CoCos contribution is important for the
objective function maximization, the diﬀerences in the risk appetite among the clusters are mainly
driven by the other optimizing variables. The clusters for which is not optimal to issue CoCos
report always a lower franchise value, because the other variables (volatility and policy rate) are not
enough to promote the DOC option as in the case for which the leverage is increased by the CoCos'
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issue. In the ﬁgure below we represent the optimized objective function per year, cluster by cluster,
comparing the banks for which is optimal to issue CoCos and the ones for which is not optimal. The
greater diﬀerence among the two emerges in the ﬁrst cluster, this is due to the higher relative value
in the optimized key variables. In third cluster, which is the most under capitalized one, after the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 the optimized objective functions diverge a lot between the two categories
(with and without CoCos). This results is driven by the DOC option as we can see in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Optimal objective function: a comparison between the banks for which is optimal
to issue CoCos and the ones for which is not optimal, per year, cluster by cluster.
In Figure 12, we display the DOC option, which represents the net present value of the growth
opportunities for the banks we consider. The results are driven to zero only during the oil crisis in
the '80s. Nevertheless, the greatest diﬀerence between the two optimal ﬁnancing strategies drives
upwards the DOC especially in the third cluster. Given the information obtained through the results
above we do not attribute the whole explanation to the diﬀerence in the ﬁnancing but also to the
diﬀerences in the optimized values of the other decision variables.
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Figure 12: DOC: a comparison between the banks for which is optimal to issue CoCos and
the ones for which is not optimal, per year, cluster by cluster.
10.4 The world after conversion with diﬀerent policy rates
The results presented above are before a potential trigger and conversion event. What happens if
the value of the underlying falls into the trigger area? First of all, the optimal amount of CoCos to
issue is on average 3% for all the clusters contemplated, which is relatively small compared to the
total amount of leverage, thus they contribute to the overall objective function maximization but
with a bounded power. Second, the above results are valid for a pre-conversion scenario or if after
conversion the value of the converted CoCos is the same. This means that if the delta conversion
ratio is smaller than one, virtually, the pre-conversion total amount of optimal CoCos to issue is
above the value estimated above, consequently we can use our results. Third, considering the optimal
amount of CoCos estimated above pre-conversion, we show below the impact of diﬀerent conversion
ratio (delta) on the optimized default put option, DOC option (both of them standardized for the
market value of the assets and franchise value, which are inputs in the second optimization) and the
objective function. In absolute terms, we notice that the optimized functions do not change much
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but the diﬀerences are substantial in relative terms. The diﬀerences in the behaviour are even more
important when we consider diﬀerent policy rates. We show the results in the following ﬁgures,
considering diﬀerences in the policy rates. In Figure 13, we show the behaviour after conversion
with an average optimal policy rate.
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Figure 13: From write-down bonds to CoCos: behaviour after conversion, with an average
optimal policy rate.
We assess the dynamics of our objective function in the zero environment for the policy rate. First,
we exhibit in Figure 14 the dynamics with a generic policy rate equal to 0.5%. In this case, the
default put option sensitivity presents a delayed decreasing behaviour. For the DOC option and the
objective function, the directions are the same but there is more variability with respect to the one
with average policy rate. Indeed, the objective function reaches its maximum after the case in which
we use an average policy rate.
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Figure 14: From write-down bonds to CoCos: behaviour after conversion, with a policy rate
of 0.5%.
Second, we introduce the negative side of the policy rates, performing a sensitivity analysis with a
rate of −0.5%, as reported in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: From write-down bonds to CoCos: behaviour after conversion, with a policy rate
of −0.5%.
In this last case we can see that the dynamics for the default put option is again decreasing from the
beginning, but the speed with which the objective function reaches the maximum is slowed down.
Hence, in this section, we learn that the conversion ratio has an impact on the shape of the elements
that accrue to the objective function. Nevertheless, the greatest determinant of the shape of the
objective function remains the DOC option, dominating over the default put one.
11 Extensions
In our model, we consider an increase in the leverage, ceteris paribus, given by an issue of CoCos.
We do not contemplate the opportunity of issuing equity because of the following concerns. First,
hybrid capital, such as CoCo bonds, are treated as debt before conversion from a ﬁscal point of
view, incentivizing CoCos issue through the beneﬁts from tax shield. This is granted in Europe,
it is instead more diﬃcult in the US, given the strict parameters under which they are eligible
for being considered debt before conversion for the US federal income tax purposes Hammer et al.
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(2011). Second, following the literature, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the
pecking order theory, where ﬁrms issue equity as a "last resort", hence, it is not an ideal candidate
for recapitalization. Stein (1992) refer to convertible bonds as a "backdoor equity ﬁnancing". He
emphasizes the feature of the call provision and reports that ﬁrms where the dividends are less than
after-tax interest payments, conversion takes place earlier, with respect to the opposite case. This
is interesting to motivate our following example. In our model, we consider the possibility to pay
a discretionary CoCos' coupon in case conversion does not take place at time t: cCoCo1{t<τConv}.
Shifting our focus from the balance sheet perspective to the income statement and to the cash ﬂow
(CF), we consider as a cost before taxes our coupon and thus, at least conforming to the European
ﬁscal regulation, the bank enjoys the tax shield over the tax deductible coupon. We compare the
following two income statement for a bank producing the same revenue, facing the same operational
expenses structure and diﬀering only for the ﬁnancing39. In the following table we consider the case
in which both coupons and dividends are payout.
Table 9: Bank income statements: a comparison between equity ﬁnancing and CoCos ﬁnanc-
ing.
Variables Income statement and CF Income statement and CF
- bank with equity ﬁnancing - bank with CoCos ﬁnancing
Revenue R R
Operational Expenses E E
EBIT R-E R-E
Interest payments 0 cCoCo
EBT R-E R-E-cCoCo
Tax η(R− E) = ψ η(R− E − cCoCo) = ψ − η(cCoCo)
Net Income R− E − ψ R− E − ψ + η(cCoCo)
Dividens dEq dCoCo
Cash position40 IC −R− E − ψ − dEq IC −R− E − ψ + η(cCoCo)− dCoCo
Tax shield and coupon savings is greater for CoCos even if compared to subordinated debt, given
the smaller coupon rate. The diﬃculties in the tax deductibility in the US is one of the main reasons
why in our sample, none of the banks issued CoCos in the time span considered. On the other
39Please note that the variable R is positive and greater than the whole amount of expenses E. We are
considering a bank whose net income is very low but still greater than zero. Interest payments for the bank
opting for recapitalization via equity are zero because straight debt is considered to be a zero-coupon, as
explained in the main assumptions of this model.
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side, the ﬁscal regulation in Europe allowing for tax shield facilitated a massive issue of CoCos in
response to the ﬁnancial crisis. In example, we can see empirically an increasing market for CoCos
after Lloyds Banking Group 2009 ﬁrst issue. We show that the cash position even if impaired by
the CoCos' coupon payout enjoys the savings due to the tax shield and the lower dividend to be
payout41 Third, CoCos' coupons are discretionary, if the CoCos are eligible as AT1. In case of
subsequent bank value deterioration, the bank might choose not to pay the coupon, which is on
average 7%, which is always greater than the average dividend yield, which is on average for the
banking industry 1.63%42. In case of bad times the bank might decide to save the coupon amount,
since it is reasonable that during bad times dividends are zero or very low and it would be incoherent
to payout high CoCos coupons. This choice accrues to the market value of the bank and returns a
greater saving amount with respect to the saving of the dividend global amount to payout. In the
next table we compare the same two banks proposed in the example above, with neither the CoCos'
coupon payment nor the dividend payment and we propose a summary of the potential savings.
Table 10: Bank savings and Cash improvement: a comparison between equity ﬁnancing and
CoCos ﬁnancing.
Variables Income statement and CF Income statement and CF
- bank with equity ﬁnancing - bank with CoCos ﬁnancing
Revenue R R
Operational Expenses E E
EBIT R-E R-E
Interest payments 0 0
EBT R-E R-E
Tax η(R− E) = ψ η(R− E − 0) = ψ
Net Income R− E − ψ R− E − ψ
Dividends 0 0
Savings/Cash improvement43 dEq dCoCo + c
CoCo
Cash position with savings44 IC −R− E − ψ + dEq IC −R− E − ψ + dCoCo + cCoCo
In this case the two banks looks identical from a proﬁt and loss point of view, but the cash ﬂows
of the two diﬀer substantially. In the ﬁrst case the cash ﬂow is improved by an amount of dEq,
which is the amount of dividends the bank opting for standard equity recapitalization is able to save
41Even if the dividend for the bank ﬁnanced via equity is lower with respect to the CoCos' coupon.
42Data are obtained from the (2014) and the A. Damodaran website: http :
//people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/NewHomePage/home.htm.
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deciding not to payout dividends. The bank, enlarging its Tier1, through a CoCos issue, if opt for
not paying the discretionary coupon would have paid to its shareholders a dividend equal to the
one of the other bank. Up to this point the amount of savings and consequent improvement of the
cash position is the same for the two banks. Nevertheless, the bank, that has issued CoCos, enjoys
a further saving equal to the coupon amount that would have been payout. We do not consider
bankruptcy costs because we assess the bank risk appetite behaviour when assets are deteriorating
but the bank is still able to run its assets and we concentrate on understanding which is the best
set of instruments in order to preserve the franchise value. We do not compare the subordinated
debt in this case because it does not accrue to the Tier1. Subordinated debt posticipates default,
but does not play a role over the franchise barrier. Subordinated debt is a Tier2 instruments and
frees resources to bank only for avoiding default, thus after that our franchise value would have been
eroded. Hence, the default barrier level is the same if a bank opt for a CoCo or subordinated debt
issue. Overall, the default put option value, ceteris paribus, do not change, but, a subordinated deb
issue would harm the DOC option, because the trigger barrier for franchise value would be relative
higher with respect to a CoCos' issue.
12 Conclusion
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008 has been the greatest global ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depres-
sion. Therefore, regulators and governments all over the world favoured the issuance of contingent
capital instruments, being potentially a useful tool for strengthening banks' capital positions and for
facing losses, as highlighted in the Financial Stability Oversight Council Report Council (2012). In
this context, we investigate the shape of risk appetite when the bank is ﬁnanced also with contingent
convertible bonds (CoCos). In our model, the manager acts in order to maximize the bank objective
function, given by the sum of the default put option and the down-and-out call option, pricing the
net present value of growth opportunities. The optimization procedure adjusts jointly the assets and
franchise value volatility, the policy rate, the level of leverage, and the consequent level of CoCos to
issue. Risk appetite is given by the ﬁrst order derivatives. We ﬁnd that both our model and Basel
III recommendations converge over their incentives regarding volatility and leverage. We show that
for banks with higher franchise value it is optimal to issue an average amount of CoCos over the
market value of the assets of 3%. CoCos do not only enlarge the distance to the default barrier
but also the franchise value one. The optimized objective function with CoCos is always higher
than the one without CoCos, this is true both at aggregate level and in the cluster analysis. On
the optimal volatility side, a decrease accrue to the DOC option, in particular for under capitalized
banks, even if this ﬁgure can't be pushed too low in order to preserve the default put option. This
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can be obtained by changing assets' composition and growth opportunities strategies. The other
optimizing decision variables are crucial in shaping risk appetite and help in understanding the
diﬀerences among the clusters. We do not diﬀerentiate ex-ante with respect to conversion between
write down bonds and CoCos but only afterwards. After conversion for the bank is always optimal
to have a conversion ratio greater than zero even if loss absorbing, thus being smaller than one. In
absolute terms, we notice that the optimized functions do not change much in value, but the diﬀer-
ences are substantial in relative terms. The diﬀerences in the behaviour are even more important
when we consider diﬀerent policy rates. Our contribution to the existent literature is to assess risk
appetite in a multi-dimensional perspective and to account for diﬀerences among banks' clusters.
We show that those peculiarities are even more important when accounting for CoCos and policy
rates approaching zero or negative ﬁgures, in a Basel III friendly framework. A ﬂat regulation could
harm certain categories of banks, especially considering volatility. On the policy rate side, we argue
that at aggregate level the average optimal rate for stability is far from the optimal ﬁgure at cluster
level. Both at aggregate and cluster level the resulting optimal policy rate is larger with respect
to the actual ﬁgure. This is particularly true in the last period of the time span considered. This
element might be taken into consideration in relative terms, since we do not account for other key
ﬁgures addressed by monetary policy.
Appendix
First order, second order and joint derivatives of the objective func-
tion
In this paragraph, for exposition reasons, leverage is deﬁned as the ratio between the market value
of straight debt and the market value of the assets together with the franchise value. This choice is
for exposition reasons.
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First order derivative with respect to leverage:
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Rho, ﬁrst order derivative with respect to the policy rate:
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First joint derivative with respect to both leverage and volatility:
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Second joint derivative with respect to both leverage and policy rate:
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Third joint derivative with respect to the policy rate and volatility:
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Second-order derivative with respect to leverage:
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Vomma, second-order derivative with respect to volatility:
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Second-order derivative with respect to the policy rate:
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Who drives the risk appetite? A simulation exercise
In the following table we perform a sensitivity analysis to change in the three optimization variables.
We comment in Section 6 how the shape of risk appetite diﬀers among the clusters. Optimal value
ranges:
• for leverage:
Cluster 21 : 0.10 ≤ lev∗ ≤ 0.11
Cluster 22 : 0.07 ≤ lev∗ ≤ 0.08
Cluster 23 : 0.06 ≤ lev∗ ≤ 0.07
(39)
FED benchmarks are:0.08 for 6 Systemically important ﬁnancial institution banks; 0.05 for
their insured bank holding ﬁrms.
• for volatility:
Cluster 21 : 0.04 ≤ σ∗ ≤ 0.06
Cluster 22 : 0.02 ≤ σ∗ ≤ 0.04
Cluster 23 : 0.01 ≤ σ∗ ≤ 0.02
(40)
Under-capitalized banks should have a relative lower volatility: higher probability to cross the
barrier and the DOC to expire.
• for policy rate:
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Cluster 21 : 0.13 ≤ rf∗ ≤ 0.15
Cluster 22 : 0.11 ≤ rf∗ ≤ 0.14
Cluster 23 : 0.04 ≤ rf∗ ≤ 0.07
(41)
We ﬁnd relative higher optimal values because we do not consider economic growth and the
simulation is based on input values derived from our empirical sample, time span (1980-2014).
A simulation exercise: which is the main driver of the objective function between
the two options for leverage?
• The optimal value for leverage in all the three clusters is above the actual levels and slightly
above FED recommendation.
• Our results take into account the franchise value (in the denominator of "leverage") and this
is a main diﬀerence between our results and the regulator ones.
• Given the pricing of the DOC option and the deﬁnition of leverage, the DOC is maximized
for lower levels of leverage.
A simulation exercise: which is the main driver of the objective function between
the two options for the volatility?
• The DOC option, being a barrier option, is optimized in our context for relative lower volatility
values: when volatility is too high, there might be a breaching of the barrier and, consequently,
a collapse of the franchise value.
• With smaller values of tier1, going from cluster 21 to 23, the peak of the optimized objective
functions moves to the left.
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• For relative smaller tier1, our barrier is much higher and smaller values of volatility ensure
the franchise value preservation.
Which is the main driver of the objective function between the two options for
the policy rate?
• The optimized objective function displays a concave shape, with minor diﬀerences in the peak
depending on the cluster.
• Once it is clear our risk appetite speciﬁcation, the policy maker change in the rate has a clear
impact.
• Overall, our optimal policy rate results slightly high because in our model we do not consider
economic growth and inﬂation.
Summary statistics and Conﬁdence intervals for optimal value of the
decision variables
We display in the following tables the summary statistics with values for actual amount of leverage
that is adapted in order to be compared to our deﬁnition of optimal leverage which consider the
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franchise value, the market value of the assets and the market value of straight debt and deposits,
but not the actual Tier1. The following table records the summary statistics for the key ﬁgures of
the sub sample of banks for which is not optimal to issue CoCos.
Table 11: Summary statistics, sub sample of banks for which is optimal to issue CoCos
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2a 5,344 0.141 0.065 0.033 0.129 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2a 5,344 0.227 0.178 0.000 0.190 0.623
Optimal_vol_2a 5,344 0.040 0.027 0.001 0.035 0.084
Optimal_leverage_2a 5,344 0.178 0.090 0.034 0.154 0.317
Optimal_policyrate_2a 5,344 0.116 0.104 0.000 0.111 0.330
CoCos_overTotalExposure 5,344 0.032 0.049 0.000 0.006 0.245
In the next table, we show the summary statistics for the key ﬁgures of the sub sample of banks
for which is not optimal to issue CoCos.
Table 12: Summary statistics, sub sample of banks for which is not optimal to issue CoCos
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2b 3,896 0.121 0.023 0.024 0.119 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2b 3,896 0.152 0.139 0.000 0.110 0.408
Optimal_vol_2b 3,896 0.035 0.011 0.011 0.033 0.056
Optimal_leverage_2b 3,896 0.120 0.047 0.023 0.120 0.213
Optimal_policyrate_2b 3,896 0.202 0.068 0.062 0.210 0.330
In the appendix we show the summary statistics and the conﬁdence intervals for the key optimized
variables. The following two tables reports the value for clusters 2a1 and 2b1.
Table 13: Summary statistics, subsample of banks for which is optimal to issue CoCos, cluster
2a1
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2a1 907 0.159 0.059 0.035 0.155 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2a1 907 0.131 0.126 0.00000 0.092 0.357
Optimal_vol_2a1 907 0.064 0.048 0.0001 0.049 0.133
Optimal_leverage_2a1 907 0.204 0.089 0.039 0.208 0.371
Optimal_policyrate_2a1 907 0.079 0.110 −0.050 0.053 0.330
CoCos_overTotalExposure2a1 907 0.035 0.046 1.0e-08 0.022 0.240
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Table 14: Summary statistics, subsample of banks for which is not optimal to issue CoCos,
cluster 2b1
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2b1 900 0.148 0.039 0.038 0.145 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2b1 900 0.064 0.063 0.000 0.044 0.173
Optimal_vol_2b1 900 0.037 0.011 0.013 0.036 0.059
Optimal_leverage_2b1 900 0.147 0.037 0.060 0.144 0.215
Optimal_policyrate_2b1 900 0.175 0.070 0.032 0.180 0.328
The subsequent tables show the results for clusters 2a2 and 2b2.
Table 15: Summary statistics, subsample of banks for which is optimal to issue CoCos, cluster
2a2
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2a2 2,075 0.132 0.054 0.035 0.122 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2a2 2,075 0.171 0.137 0.00000 0.138 0.431
Optimal_vol_2a2 2,075 0.043 0.029 0.0001 0.039 0.092
Optimal_leverage_2a2 2,075 0.158 0.067 0.037 0.140 0.270
Optimal_policyrate_2a2 2,075 0.105 0.099 −0.050 0.092 0.304
CoCos_overTotalExposure2a2 2,075 0.027 0.048 1.0e-08 0.008 0.242
Table 16: Summary statistics, subsample of banks for which is not optimal to issue CoCos,
cluster 2b2
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2b2 2,000 0.127 0.043 0.034 0.126 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2b2 2,000 0.131 0.118 0.000 0.099 0.356
Optimal_vol_2b2 2,000 0.036 0.010 0.015 0.035 0.056
Optimal_leverage_2b2 2,000 0.126 0.042 0.033 0.126 0.207
Optimal_policyrate_2b2 2,000 0.198 0.060 0.081 0.200 0.319
This last set of two tables present the results for clusters 2a3 and 2b3.
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Table 17: Summary statistics, subsample of banks for which is optimal to issue CoCos, cluster
2a3
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2a3 2,362 0.142 0.074 0.033 0.125 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2a3 2,362 0.305 0.183 0.00000 0.330 0.833
Optimal_vol_2a3 2,362 0.032 0.020 0.0001 0.029 0.064
Optimal_leverage_2a3 2,362 0.203 0.127 0.034 0.173 0.379
Optimal_policyrate_2a3 2,362 0.139 0.098 −0.050 0.143 0.330
CoCos_overTotalExposure2a3 2,362 0.035 0.049 1.0e-08 0.016 0.245
Table 18: Summary statistics, subsample of banks for which is not optimal to issue CoCos,
cluster 2b3
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
leverage_actual_2b3 996 0.083 0.042 0.024 0.071 0.236
Franchise_overMVA_2b3 996 0.273 0.161 0.000 0.285 0.693
Optimal_vol_2b3 996 0.028 0.010 0.009 0.027 0.046
Optimal_leverage_2b3 996 0.078 0.031 0.023 0.071 0.133
Optimal_policyrate_2b3 996 0.232 0.072 0.072 0.250 0.330
The following table shows the conﬁdence intervals for the key optimized variables, taking into
account a conﬁdence interval at 95% and quantiles are taken from the normal distribution given
the high number of observation and the underlying framework. Conﬁdence intervals for cluster 21
Table 19: Conﬁdence Intervals for key optimized variables, conﬁdence level 95%
Variables Left hand endpoint Right hand endpoint
Franchise_overMVA_2a 0.2219 0.2315
Optimal_vol_2a 0.0392 0.0406
Optimal_leverage_2a 0.1758 0.1806
Optimal_policyrate_2a 0.1129 0.1185
CoCos_overTotalExposure 0.0310 0.0336
Franchise_overMVA_2b 0.1474 0.1561
Optimal_vol_2b 0.0343 0.0350
Optimal_leverage_2b 0.1185 0.1214
Optimal_policyrate_2b 0.1997 0.2039
Conﬁdence intervals for cluster 22. Conﬁdence intervals for cluster 23.
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Table 20: Conﬁdence Intervals for key optimized variables, cluster 21
Variables Left hand endpoint Right hand endpoint
Franchise_overMVA_2a1 0.1224 0.1389
Optimal_vol_2a1 0.0606 0.0669
Optimal_leverage_2a1 0.1985 0.2100
Optimal_policyrate_2a1 0.0718 0.0861
CoCos_overTotalExposure2a1 0.0321 0.0381
Franchise_overMVA_2b1 0.0598 0.0680
Optimal_vol_2b1 0.0364 0.0379
Optimal_leverage_2b1 0.1441 0.1490
Optimal_policyrate_2b1 0.1707 0.1799
Table 21: Conﬁdence Intervals for key optimized variables, cluster 22
Variables Left hand endpoint Right hand endpoint
Franchise_overMVA_2a2 0.1651 0.1769
Optimal_vol_2a2 0.0416 0.0441
Optimal_leverage_2a2 0.1549 0.1607
Optimal_policyrate_2a2 0.1006 0.1091
CoCos_overTotalExposure2a2 0.0254 0.0296
Franchise_overMVA_2b2 0.1255 0.1359
Optimal_vol_2b2 0.0360 0.0369
Optimal_leverage_2b2 0.1245 0.1282
Optimal_policyrate_2b2 0.1959 0.2011
Table 22: Conﬁdence Intervals for key optimized variables, cluster 23
Variables Left hand endpoint Right hand endpoint
Franchise_overMVA_2a3 0.2974 0.3121
Optimal_vol_2a3 0.0313 0.0329
Optimal_leverage_2a3 0.1979 0.2081
Optimal_policyrate_2a3 0.1347 0.1427
CoCos_overTotalExposure2a3 0.0335 0.0374
Franchise_overMVA_2b3 0.2626 0.2825
Optimal_vol_2b3 0.0277 0.0289
Optimal_leverage_2b3 0.0762 0.0801
Optimal_policyrate_2b3 0.2272 0.2361
86
Evolution of Tier 1 and total exposure cluster 2a3
It is interesting to see the evolution of Tier 1 and the total exposure for cluster2a3. We show that
from one side the Tier 1 has increased sharply in the last period but on the other side the total
exposure is depressed. This may be explained through an issue of Tier 1 instruments, which not
being hybrid capital, it should be equity. This equity issue may have depressed the market value of
the bank and thus the market value of the assets and the related franchise value.
Figure 16: Tier 1 and total exposure evolution cluster 2a3.
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Chapter 3
CoCo bonds and Write Down bonds
impact on banks' risk appetite and
investment policy45
Abstract
This paper investigates the risk appetite of a bank ﬁnanced also with contingent
convertible (CoCo) bonds and Write Down (WD) bonds and the impact this ﬁnancing
has on the investment policy. We conduct an empirical analysis on the whole spectrum
of CoCos and WDs available over the time span 2009 - September 2015. We argue that
the impact of those hybrid instruments on the bank investment policy is non-monotonic.
It is described by a U-shaped curve for bank riskiness and by a inverted-U curve for bank
growth. We show that issuing up to 25 bps of AD Tier 1 hybrids over total assets for the
overall sample (up to 38 bps, considering the non systemic bank sample) is correlated
with lower bank riskiness and higher growth opportunities. In general, there is still room
for issuing hybrids belonging to AD Tier 1, containing bank riskiness and promoting
bank growth but the marginal impact is not statistically signiﬁcant for systemic banks.
Tier 2 instruments outstanding are too many and have increased bank riskiness and
decreased bank growth. We ﬁnd similar results implementing a diﬀerent model. Our
results are, thus, relevant for investors, ﬁnancial decision-makers, and regulators.
Keywords: risk appetite, growth opportunities, impact, Tier 1 hybrids, Tier 2 hybrids
45We acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Europlace Institute of Finance (EIF) and the Labex Louis
Bachelier (Grant 2016).
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This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 13, we state the main objectives and explain the
relevance of our research in the context of the existing literature. In Section 16, we present the
research methodology and Section 18 shows the results. Finally, we conclude.
13 Introduction
The main goal of our research is to assess empirically banks' risk appetite and investment policy
when their ﬁnancing structure includes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds and (or) write-down
(WD) bonds, hybrid capital securities that absorb losses when the capital of the issuing bank falls
below a certain threshold. The main diﬀerence between the two ﬁnancing instruments is that
CoCos convert to equity, while WDs convert to zero. We aim to study pros and cons of issuing
WDs/CoCos with respect to their impact on banks' risk-taking and investments. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to address these questions empirically. In the post- Lehman
Brothers failure, governments announced the end of the "too big to fail". In this context, issuing
loss absorbing instruments has gained increasing popularity. Between 2009 and 2015, banks issued
more than 380 billion of CoCos46. Regulation plays a crucial role in determining CoCos issuance.
Under Basel III, CoCo bonds are eligible as either Additional Tier 1 (AT1) or Tier 2 (T2), which
are types of capital apparently preferred by banks with respect to equity to accomplish regulatory
requirements, given that they are cheaper and less dilutive than issuing equity. From 2009 to 2014,
about half of the CoCos outstanding were eligible as AT1 and in 2015 about 76% were AT1 CoCos.
The greatest amount of CoCos issued worldwide is in Europe, followed by Asia. In the US, banks
have not yet issued this kind of instrument for many reasons: ﬁrst, while implementing the Basel
III, the US regulators does not allow CoCos to be part of the AT1 capital; second, the uncertainty
related to tax deductibility of interest payments on CoCos is not resolved (von Furstenberg (2014)).
Hence, Europe is the appropriate environment to study CoCos and WDs issues. The conclusions
of this study are relevant for both the US and European regulators, ﬁnancial decision-makers and
investors. There is no convergence in the opinions concerning those instruments mainly due to the
uncertainty around their impact and the diﬃculties in understanding their conversion mechanisms.
There are CoCos supporters, like Switzerland's FINMA and Bank of England, and opponents, such
as Deutsche Bank47. Our analysis is driven by the concerns economists have regarding the impact of
CoCos and WDs on bank risk appetite. Neel Kashkari, Minneapolis Fed's President, warns against
instruments like CoCos, suggesting that ..transferring risk to investors won't protect taxpayers from
46Data from Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Quarterly Rated and Tracked CoCo Monitor Database-
Year End 2015
47Financial Times, ECB is having second thoughts on CoCo bonds, 04.24.2016
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bailout48. What is the impact of introducing hybrid capital like CoCos and WDs into banks' the
ﬁnancing structure on their risk appetite and investment decisions? In the time span considered,
banks increased their Tier 1, issuing CoCos and WDs, and it is not clear whether they shift to safer
assets in the period considered as the RWAs do not move a lot. We understand that we have a
loss of information assessing the sample as a whole, thus we distinguish between systemic and non
systemic banks, considering as systemic the largest 25%. Assessing the impact on bank riskiness and
growth opportunities, what makes the diﬀerence among hybrids is the Tier to which they belong
and not if they are WDs or CoCos. We ﬁnd that the relation between hybrids and bank riskiness is
non monotonic and can be described by a U-shaped curve. Interestingly, the relation between bank
growth opportunities and hybrids is also non monotonic but we display a inverted-U shaped curve.
We show that issuing up to 25 bps of AD Tier 1 hybrids over total assets for the overall sample
(up to 38 bps, considering the non systemic bank sample), is correlated with lower bank riskiness
and higher growth opportunities. Up to those ﬁgures, also the marginal impact is signiﬁcant. For
systemic banks it is also true that there is still room for issuing hybrids belonging to AD Tier 1,
containing bank riskiness and promoting bank growth but the marginal impact is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Shifting our focus on Tier 2 instruments, we ﬁnd that there are too many of them
outstanding, meaning that with the actual amount present in the banking ﬁnancing structure, the
banks are increasing their riskiness and depressing their growth potential. The optimal amount of
those kind of instruments is very small (less than 10 bps of Tier 2 hybrids relative to total assets).
In the case of growth opportunities the optimal quantity is even smaller leading to display only
the decreasing side of the parabola describing this behaviour. In the robustness check section, we
propose a comparison of those results with an application of Aquila and Barone-Adesi (2017)'s model
to this dataset. We show that on average it would be optimal to have 1.7% of AD Tier 1 hybrids but
keeping a relative low volatility. This would be more in line with what the Basel regulators suggest
proposing its capital requirement ratio in Basel III rule. In theory, the incentives go in the direction
of the optimization results. From one side, there is an incentive in increasing Tier 1, and, on the
other side, in decreasing RWAs.
14 Practical value
Currently, both academic and professional opinions disagree on the potential impact of CoCo and
WD bonds on banks' ﬁnancing and investing policies. Our ambition is to shed light on the potential
side eﬀects arising from including those instruments in the ﬁnancing structure of banks. The results
48The Wall Street Journal, Fed's Kashkari Says Transferring Risk to Investors Won't Protect Taxpayers
From Bailout, 04.18.2016
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of this study should be of major interest for regulators and ﬁnancial decision makers. Additionally,
understanding and assessing the degree of risk-shifting incentives faced by banks is important for
various types of investors (banks' shareholders and debt-holders), but also to the broader class of
investors in those instruments.
15 Literature review
We rely on two main strands of literature on contingent convertible bonds. Given our research
interest, ﬁrst, we focus on the papers assessing the riskiness of banks and their propensity to risk-
shift, second, on those assessing agency issues. Hilscher and Raviv (2014) argue that CoCos are
an eﬀective tool for stabilizing ﬁnancial institutions. They ﬁnd the optimal conversion ratio that
eliminates stockholders' incentives to risk-shift. A ﬁrst comprehensive empirical study on CoCos is
conducted by Avdjiev et al. (2015). They interestingly show that CoCos issuance reduces banks'
credit risk and investors in CoCos view those instruments as risky and place a signiﬁcant likelihood
on the possibility of conversion.The conversion trigger is widely assessed in the literature. Flannery
(2010) proposes that the trigger be based on the market value of equity. Sundaresan and Wang
(2015) illustrate that a market value based conversion trigger for contingent convertibles may lead
to multiple equilibrium and market manipulations. A unique equilibrium is reached only in the
case in which there is no value transfer between bank equity and contingent debt at conversion.
Wealth transfer among diﬀerent categories of stakeholders is relevant for governments. Roy and
El-Herraoui (2016) demonstrate the complexity of designing a fair and eﬀective bail-in regime. The
regulator is mainly confronted with the choice of implementing or not the wealth transfer. If it
chooses to do so, it faces the risk of requests for compensation and arbitrage behaviour in ﬁnancial
markets. Maes and Schoutens (2012) discuss the impact of the trigger event and the conversion ratio
on hazard contagion and the death spiral of systemic risk. Attaoui and Poncet (2015) develop the
model showing that credit spread on straight debt is lower if the ﬁrm has WD bonds in its ﬁnancing
structure, given the cushion function of the WDs with respect to the straight debt (senior). CoCos
are nearer to equity because in some states of the world they are not debt. Converting to equity,
agency costs of equity are greater for CoCos with respect to write-downs that never transform
into equity. Thus write-downs are more eﬃcient in solving agency costs of equity. Both of them
diminish debt overhang problem and the bankruptcy costs (the present value of bankruptcy costs).
Furthermore, WDs have some advantages with respect to CoCos: there is no multiple equilibrium,
no market manipulation (to avoid losses), that at least partially solves the death spiral issue. On the
bankruptcy costs side, Chen et al. (2013) show that replacing some straight debt with CoCos lowers
the endogenous default barrier and therefore increases the ﬁrm's ability to mitigate a loss in asset
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value. This reduces bankruptcy costs and increases the value of equity. Albul et al. (2010) provide
a tax shield argument in favour of the hybrid capital. They conclude that banks should substitute
CoCos for straight debt because, on one hand, they provide the same protection as equity, and, on
the other hand, they allow the most of the tax shield beneﬁts. Diﬀerent governments do not allow
the same tax treatment of the hybrid capital, thus diﬀerences in tax shield could be relevant driver
of the preference to issue WDs over CoCos.
16 Main hypothesis development
16.1 CoCos, WDs and banks' risk-taking behavior
Banks started issuing CoCos in the late 2009, after the enforcement of Basel III rule (even if its full
application starts in 2015), whose focus on capital requirements deals with the ratio between RWA
and Tier1 which has to be larger than 6% a predetermined threshold. In this perspective an issue
of Tier 1 instruments should decrease the ratio (enlarging the denominator) per se even if keeping
RWA constant. Considering the potential impact of a bond converted to equity, we expect that the
existing shareholders would resist to engage in excessive risk-taking projects because otherwise they
would share the bank capital with the new class of "converted" equity-holders. In this spirit we
argue ex-ante that the CoCos of both Tier1 and Tier2 should decrease the riskiness of the assets.
The fact that Basel III allows the banks to issue only small amount of hybrids and the literature
concerning the death-spiral, lead us to think that there might be a non-monotonic relation among
the hybrids outstanding and the riskiness of the assets.
Hypothesis I : For smaller amount of CoCos and WDs issued, the bank riskiness decreases and
the relation is non-monotonic.
We consider the following OLS ﬁxed-eﬀects (within) regression, where we want to understand the
non-monotonic relation between the hybrid instruments and the riskiness of the bank. We do not
distinguish between CoCos and WDs, since our focus relies on the diﬀerence between Tier1 and
Tier2 instruments.
RWAAi,t = α+β1ADTier1i,t+β2Tier2i,t+β3ADTier12i,t+β4Tier22i,t+γControlsi,t+δi+τt+vi,t
(42)
WhereRWAA is our proxy for the bank riskiness. We smooth the bank RWA, assessing it relative
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to the total assets (book value). The explaining variables are (i) ADTier1, the outstanding amount
of CoCos and WDs belonging to Tier 1 over total assets, (ii) Tier2, the outstanding amount of CoCos
and WDs belonging to Tier 2 over total assets, (iii) ADTier12, the square of the outstanding amount
of CoCos and WDs belonging to Tier 1 over total assets, (iv) Tier22, the square of the outstanding
amount of CoCos and WDs belonging to Tier 2 over total assets. Those last two elements capture the
non-monotonic relation. t indexes calendar quarters, ADTier1i,t and Tier2i,t represent the amount
outstanding for bank i in quarter t of CoCo bonds and WD bonds as a fraction of total assets. We
perform the same regression also per year and we observe similar results. δi are bank ﬁxed-eﬀects
and τ t are time ﬁxed eﬀects. Controlsi,t is a vector of time-varying bank characteristics (for the
while we display the results only for leverage, but we performed the regression controlling also for
the logarithm of the total assets and results do not change).
Before conversion, we could expect that the two diﬀerent Tier instruments might impact diﬀer-
ently over the risk appetite of the bank, thinking about it in a Merton framework, where Additional
Tier 1 instruments should decrease the default put option and Tier 2 hybrids should increase it. Af-
ter conversion, instead, they both accrue to the Common equity Tier 1 diminishing the default put.
We expect that it is their contingent convertibility the key argument having an impact in shaping
the risk appetite of the bank. In a scenario where conversion is not such a remote event, the bank
should not be encouraged to undertake too risky projects that would lead to a conversion, without
distinguishing between ADT1 or Tier 2 instruments. Hence, we expect to have β1 and β2 smaller
than zero. β3 and β4, the beta of the quadratic terms should be of the opposite sign, due to the fact
that we expect that after a certain threshold the behaviour might change. We assess for each kind of
hybrids, where is the minimum of the parabola describing the behaviour of the RWAA with respect
to each Tier hybrids instruments. First, we assess the impact those hybrids instruments have on the
bank riskiness for the whole sample we have at disposal. Then we divide it into systemic and not
systemic banks, considering as systemic, the banks with total assets in the top 25%. This lead us
to two other related hypothesis.
Hypothesis II : For non systemic banks, smaller quantities of hybrid capital issued belonging to
Tier 1 play a role in decreasing the bank riskiness and the relation is non-monotonic.
Hypothesis III : Systemic banks have issued already too many CoCos and WDs, thus any further
issue increase the bank riskiness and the relation is non-monotonic.
For systemic banks, we expect that the average value issued of hybrids to be nearer to the min-
imum of the parabola or it might be even larger. CoCos and WDs have been ﬁrst issued by larger
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banks also because of the appeal they had for improving the regulatory requirements ﬁgures without
modifying the investment strategy and consequently the composition of RWAs.
16.2 CoCos, WDs and banks' growth opportunities
On one side the bank has to balance its riskiness, also to accomplish to the Basel requirements.
On the other side, the bank has to prepare a capital structure which is able to sustain also growth
opportunities. As we did above, we do not distinguish between CoCos and WDs, since our focus
relies on the diﬀerence between Tier1 and Tier2 instruments. Ceteris paribus, the hybrids contribute
to decrease the bank riskiness and promote the growth opportunities. We test this hypothesis on
the whole sample.
Hypothesis IV : For smaller amount of CoCos and WDs issued, the bank growth opportunities in-
crease and the relation is non-monotonic.
We propose the following OLS ﬁxed-eﬀects (within) regression, in order to assess the non-
monotonic relation between the hybrid instruments and the banks' growth opportunities.
Qi,t = α+β1ADTier1i,t+β2Tier2i,t+β3ADTier12i,t+β4Tier22i,t+γControlsi,t+δi+τt+vi,t (43)
Where Q is the Q ratio, deﬁned as the ratio between market value of the bank its book value,
and is our proxy for the banks' growth opportunities. Given that we want to understand the op-
timal capital structure for the banks in our sample, we do not modify the explanatory side of the
equation. We expect that the hybrids contribute to increase the Q ratio of the bank being resources
available for being invested in new projects. Our argument relies also in this case on the contingent
convertibility of those instruments. Focusing on this element, there is a clear implied incentive for
the bank not to undertake too risky projects otherwise the present shareholders' wealth might be
impaired by the consequent dilution due to the conversion of the hybrids. In this case, β1 and β2
should be positive and, conforming to the non-monotonic relation, β3 and β4 should be negative.
We argue that for smaller amount of hybrids issued there is no signiﬁcant capital dilution, but for
larger amount of them there are too many fresh ﬁnancial resources available that there might be
the incentive to invest in value-destroying projects. Similarly, we assess this issue in a framework
where we describe the growth opportunities with a Down-and-Out call (DOC) option (as in Aquila
and Barone-Adesi (2017), please refer to the model summarized in the Appendix). On one hand,
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for smaller quantity of hybrids belonging to AD Tier 1 and for relative lower volatility, the DOC
option increases in value because the distance to the barrier is increased and the probability to
touch the barrier is relative smaller. On the other hand, issuing too many hybrids might be corre-
lated with higher bank riskiness which might lead to the touch of the barrier and the consequent
expiration of the growth opportunities. Those elements drive us to test the following two hypothesis.
Hypothesis V : For non systemic banks, smaller quantities of hybrid capital issued belonging to
Tier 1 play a role in increasing the bank's growth opportunities and the relation is non-monotonic.
Hypothesis VI : Systemic banks have issued already too many CoCos and WDs, thus any further
issue decrease the bank's growth opportunities and the relation is non-monotonic.
We expect that too many hybrids may lead to death spiral or other issues discussed in the literature
which could damage growth opportunities. From a methodological point of view, we contribute also
in promoting a new way of interpreting the regression results. Thanks to our analysis concerning
the marginal impact, we understand more deeply the dynamic of the results obtained through the
regression.
17 Data
We collect data on CoCos and WD bonds issued worldwide from Bloomberg. These kind of issues
are available since 2009. Since we distinguish between Tier 1 and Tier 2, we consider only hybrids
clearly attributable to Tier 1 or Tier 2. We get a historical data on the Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs)
of the issuing banks and their issue characteristics. Relevant issue characteristics include: identiﬁers
of the issuer (CUSIP, ISIN, name, Bloomberg Ticker); country of the issuer; issue date; maturity
date; issue type, i.e., whether the issued bond is a CoCo or WD bond; trigger level; amount issued;
tier type and rating; balance sheet items and market prices. Assessing the summary statistics of
the data (Table 23), in a time series perspective, we observe the following key stylized facts. First
of all, the median of the ratio between Tier 1 and the risk-weighted assets double itself in the time
span considered (Figure 17). This is mainly due to an increase in the Additional Tier 1 which is
part of the broader Tier 1 (Figure 18) as it easy to understand the relative preference in issuing
other instruments than equity. Second, the risk-weighted assets do not sink at all during after 2009
(Figure 19), they do not move a lot, thus the improvement in the ratio is mainly driven by the
increase in the Additional Tier 1. This is interesting given that Basel III focusing on the ratio
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between Tier 1 and RWAs, and giving it a lower bound of 6%49, gives the bank two channel for
improving it: from one side, the bank might increase the Tier1, and from the other side, the bank
could decrease the RWAs. We remark that the banks in the sample increase the Additional Tier 1
and do not diminish the RWAs. Given the period considered, it is not too diﬃcult to understand
that the growth opportunities, identiﬁed through the Q ratio, swing. They start recovering in the
second half of 2012 (Figure 20).
18 Results
18.1 Do CoCos and WDs play a role in decreasing banks' riskiness?
This section presents the main results concerning the ﬁrst three hypothesis. The results are reported
in Table 24. Column (1) display the results for Hypothesis I and the other two columns show the
results of the test over Hypothesis II and III. Overall, we ﬁnd that our results are consistent with
our hypothesis. Starting from the regression table, we observe that in all the three regressions the
beta of the ﬁrst order variables are negative and the beta of the squared variables are positive. These
results show that the relation between the RWAA and the explanatory variables can be described via
a U-shaped curve, thus the hybrids outstanding ﬁrst play a role in decreasing banks' riskiness and
after reaching the minimum level banks' riskiness increases. Considering the Hypothesis I, Figure
21 exhibits that the marginal eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant up to 53 bps. It means that, ceteris
paribus, issuing up to 53 bps of hybrids (relative to total assets) belonging to AD Tier 1 is correlated
with a decrease in the bank riskiness. After this threshold the impact is no more signiﬁcant. Our
banks have issued exactly 53 bps thus they are at the optimum in terms of relative amount of AD
Tier1 instruments issued for decreasing RWAA. The minimum of the U-shaped curve is at 166 bps
but after 53 bps we show that the impact on RWAA is not statistically signiﬁcant. Regarding Tier 2
hybrids, it is interesting to see that it is the squared parameter which is signiﬁcant in the regression
table and Figure 22 shows that in this sample there are already too many Tier 2 hybrids. This
means that we are already in the increasing side of the U-shaped curve where the bank riskiness
increases with the amount outstanding of Tier 2 hybrids. We ﬁnd that the minimum is at 5bps,
thereafter the impact of the Tier 2 hybrids is statistically signiﬁcant above 13bps. On average we
have 10 bps of those hybrids outstanding meaning that we are already on the increasing side of the
curve. Thus those hybrids are correlated with higher bank riskiness. Moving to the Hypothesis II,
we focus on non systemic banks. At a ﬁrst glance, we might think that for each 1% more of hybrids
49This lower bound has been applicable since 2015, thus we consider the cumulative amount of the hybrids
at stake for each bank
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outstanding the RWAA ﬁgure decrease by 0.08% if the hybrids belong to AD Tier 1 and by 0.55%
if they are Tier 2; however, the marginal eﬀect depends also on the squared term, the marginal
eﬀect is depicted in ﬁgure 24. For the AD Tier 1 CoCos and WDs this impact is also statistically
signiﬁcant but the magnitude of the increasing impact is smaller than in the case of Tier 2 hybrids
(Table 24). The marginal impact of ADT1 instruments shows that on average we are at 63bps and
the minimum of the parabola is at 151bps meaning that there is still room for decreasing RWAA
issuing those hybrids. Anyway, we ﬁnd that this ﬁgure might not be taken into account since the
marginal impact is not statistically signiﬁcant(Table 27, Table 28 and Figure 23). In the case of Tier
2 instruments, we ﬁnd that the bank behaviour moved toward riskier assets, since the minimum of
the parabola is reached for 4bps and the average issue consists of 14bps which is also the threshold
above which the impact is considered to be signiﬁcant (Table 27, Table 28 and Figure 24).
Hypothesis III is not conﬁrmed in the data. Larger institutions have already too many hybrids
outstanding (both AD Tier 1 and Tier 2) that the marginal impact of any change in the amount of
issued hybrid capital would not aﬀect the bank riskiness. In Figure 25, we can see that in this case
we are in the increasing part of the parabola, but the marginal impact is not statistically signiﬁcant.
18.2 Do CoCos and WDs impact positively banks' growth oppor-
tunities?
We obtain very interesting results regarding the impact that CoCos and WDs have on banks' growth
opportunities. We ﬁnd that the relation between growth opportunities and hybrids outstanding is
non-monotonic and appears to be well described by a inverted-U shaped curve in conformity with
Hypothesis IV. Hence, this is an opposite result with respect to what we ﬁnd above. For smaller
amount of hybrids outstanding, the impact over the banks' growth opportunities is positive, up to
the maximum level reached by the curve, after which the impact of the hybrids starts depressing
banks' growth. Looking at Table 31, we ﬁnd results consistent with the hypothesis. β1 and β2 are
positive and the beta of the squared variables are negative as predicted in Hypothesis IV.
The inverted-U shape of the ceteris paribus dynamic of the Q ratio with respect to a variation in
the hybrids outstanding shows both its increasing and decreasing side only for AD Tier 1 instruments
belonging to the overall sample and to the non systemic banks sub-sample Assessing the overall
sample, the maximum of the parabola is reached for 220bps and on average our banks have issued
53 bps. We are still on the increasing side of the parabola and there should be room for issuing
hybrids and still increase growth opportunities. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that this impact is signiﬁcant
only till 25bps (Table 32, Table 33, Figure 27 and Figure 28). This results are mainly driven by
the sub-sample of non systemic banks. Those banks have issued on average 63bps of hybrids and
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the maximum of the parabola is reached for 227bps. Apparently, Hypothesis V, is satisﬁed because
a further issue of hybrids could still be correlated with an increase banks' growth. However, the
impact is signiﬁcant only till 38bps of hybrids issued. For Tier 2 instruments in both cases the
amount issued are much larger than the maximum of the parabola but none of the results are
statistically signiﬁcant. For the Q ratio, Tier 2 hybrids, before conversion, are more similar to debt
and less to equity and this is captured by the fact that we can ﬁnd only the decreasing side of the
inverted-U curve for Tier 2 instruments. For systemic banks we ﬁnd not statistically signiﬁcant
results, even if in general we obtain only the decreasing side of the parabola. Thus the results for
this category of banks are not consistent with Hypothesis VI.
18.3 Robustness check
We have already discussed that our regressions are robust controlling for leverage, banks dimensions,
separate speciﬁcation of CoCos and WDs. More interestingly, we compare the empirical results we
obtained above with what predicts the model developed by Aquila and Barone-Adesi (2017) applied
to our sample. The model is described in the Appendix. In this model, the bank is assessed in a
Merton framework where the manager maximizes the bank value, which is partly due to the sum of
a down-and-out call option and a default put option. The optimization variables are leverage, and
volatility. We obtain the optimal quantity of hybrids belonging to AD Tier 1 comparing the optimal
leverage to the actual one, expressed in Basel terms, i.e. the ratio between Tier 1 and the total
exposure. In this model we assimilate Tier 2 hybrids before conversion to debt. In this speciﬁcation,
the default put option is favoured by Tier 2 instruments. On the other side the DOC option is an
increasing function of AD Tier 1 instruments and decreasing one of Tier 2 hybrids. We ﬁnd that
on average the banks in the sample should issue 1.7% of AD Tier 1 instruments, while keeping a
7.7% of optimal leverage and a 3.6% of volatility (Table 38 and Figure 33). In the sample there are
also some banks who have already too many hybrids outstanding, which are the larger ones. We
have to point out that the median optimal volatility is 2.5%. In this model, the optimal parameters
comes from a joint optimization procedure. This is crucial in our analysis, because in Basel III,
the regulator propose as capital requirements target ratio the one given by Tier 1 over RWAs. We
show that for having an average 1.7% of AD Tier 1 instruments outstanding it is necessary to have
a quite low volatility. We stress this important issue because we have seen that on average, in the
sample span considered, the banks didn't decrease the RWAs at all, they kept them constant and the
results of the regression we performed above signal thatceteris paribus there are too many hybrids
outstanding, thus the RWAs are even increased and Q ratio depressed. This might be given also
because the banks didn't shift their investment policy to safer assets.
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19 Conclusions
In this paper, we want to understand the impact Additional Tier 1 CoCos and WDs and Tier 2
hybrid instruments have on the bank riskiness and growth opportunities. This is one of the few
empirical papers on CoCos and WDs, due to the scarcity and bad quality of the data available. We
test our hypothesis over all the data available from banks spread all over the world. In conformity to
our hypothesis we ﬁnd that (i) hybrids have a non monotonic impact on bank riskiness and on bank
growth opportunities. Interestingly, on one side, the relation between hybrids and bank riskiness is
described by a U-shaped curve and, on the other side, with respect to growth opportunities, we have
a inverted-U shaped curve, leading to a trade-oﬀ. Hence, it is relevant to ﬁnd a balance between
containing bank riskiness and contemporaneously promoting bank growth. The banks in our sample
issued an amount of AD Tier 1 hybrids which is correlated with a decrease in bank riskiness and
an improvement in bank growth opportunities. We show that (ii) for a smaller amount of AD
Tier1 hybrids outstanding (up to 25 bps for the overall sample and up to 38 for the non systemic
banks), the impact is signiﬁcant. (iii) From one side, it is correlated with lower bank riskiness, on
the other side, with higher growth opportunities. Shifting our focus on systemic banks due to the
sample composition we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant marginal impact but as in the previous analysis,
the average issue is still far from the minimum (maximum) of the parabola for the bank riskiness
(growth opportunities). (iv) Considering Tier 2 instruments, we ﬁnd that there are too many of
them outstanding and, in the case of bank riskiness, (v) our banks have overtaken the minimum of
the parabola and place themselves in the increasing side promoting, this way, bank riskiness. Their
marginal impact is also signiﬁcant for the overall and non systemic bank sample. In the case of the
Q ratio, Tier 2 instruments are also too many but the marginal impact is not statistically signiﬁcant
and the maximum of the parabola is reached later with respect to the minimum in the case of the
bank riskiness. In the robustness check, we show also that (vi) on average it would be optimal to
have on average 1.7% of AD Tier 1 hybrids but keeping a relative low volatility. This would be
more in line with what the regulators suggest proposing its capital requirement ratio. In theory, the
incentives go in the direction of the optimization results. From one side, there is an incentive in
increasing Tier 1, and, on the other side, in decreasing RWAs.
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Tables and Figures
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Figure 17: Tier1 ratio improvement between 2009 and 2015.
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Figure 18: Additional Tier1 improvement between 2009 and 2015.
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Figure 19: RWAs are constant between 2009 and 2015.
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Figure 20: Q ratio swing.
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Table 23: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Tier1_TA 1135 0.050 0.023 0.008 0.048 0.145
ADT1_TA (in bps) 1135 0.010 0.124 0.000 0.000 3.226
T2_TA (in bps) 1135 0.0004 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.143
Q_ratio 1135 0.028 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.100
RWA_TA 1135 0.554 0.257 .000 0.566 5.483
Table 24: In this table, we assess the impact hybrids capital have on banks' riskiness, through
the following regression: RWAAi,t = α + β1ADTier1i,t + β2Tier2i,t + β3ADTier12i,t +
β4Tier22i,t + γControlsi,t + δi + τt + vi,t. The regression has robust standard errors and
includes controls for leverage, bank quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. In the ﬁrst column it is performed
on the whole sample, in the second column on the sub-sample of non systemic banks and in
the third column we display results for the systemic sub-sample
(1) (Non Systemic) (Systemic)
ADTier1 -0.1194 -0.0891 -0.3722
(2.54)** (1.71)* (0.76)
Tier2 -0.7065 -0.5587 -7.7206
(1.64) (1.14) (0.82)
ADTier12 0.0358 0.0294 0.9766
(2.20)** (1.69)* (0.53)
Tier22 6.4170 5.8850 440.7535
(3.81)*** (2.96)*** (0.71)
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.16
N 1,140 857 283
Table 25: Tests: overall results of the hybrids impact over RWArelative to total assets
Statistic for Testnl chi2 Prob>chi2 Min (bps) Not signiﬁcant bef./aft.
ADT1 overall −β[ADTier1]/(2 ∗ β[ADTier12]) = 0 43.93 0.000 166.76277 53
Tier2 overall −β[Tier2]/(2 ∗ β[Tier22]) = 0 7.61 0.0058 5.5052165 13
Table 26: Mean estimation: mean Tier1
Statistic for Mean Std. Err. Conf. intervals 95%
Tier 1 if ADTier1>0 .5362476 .058966 .4201441 .6523511
Tier 2 if Tier2>0 .1087488 .0120724 .0845919 .1329057
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Figure 21: Tier1 hybrid instruments' impact over RWA relative to total assets.
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Figure 22: Tier2 hybrid instruments' impact over RWA relative to total assets.
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Table 27: Non systemic banks: tests
Statistic for Testnl chi2 Prob>chi2 Min (bps) Not signiﬁcant bef./aft.
ADT1 non systemic −β[ADTier1]/(2 ∗ β[ADTier12]) = 0 26.95 0.000 151.48119 NA
Tier2 non systemic −β[Tier2]/(2 ∗ β[Tier22]) = 0 3.16 0.0755 4.7465829 14
Table 28: Non systemic banks: Mean estimation
Statistic for Mean Std. Err. Conf. intervals 95%
Tier 1 if ADTier1>0 .6311542 .0683327 .4964904 .7658181
Tier 2 if Tier2>0 .1420174 .0126398 .1165436 .1674913
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Figure 23: Non systemic banks: Tier1 hybrid instruments' impact over RWA relative to total
assets.
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Figure 24: Non systemic banks: Tier2 hybrid instruments' impact over RWA relative to total
assets.
Table 29: Systemic banks: tests
Statistic for Testnl chi2 Prob>chi2 Min (bps) Not signiﬁcant bef./aft.
ADT1 non systemic −β[ADTier1]/(2 ∗ β[ADTier12]) = 0 2.63 0.1046 19.058562 NA
Tier2 non systemic −β[Tier2]/(2 ∗ β[Tier22]) = 0 19.11 0.000 .87584093 NA
Table 30: Systemic banks: Mean estimation
Statistic for Mean Std. Err. Conf. intervals 95%
Tier 1 if ADTier1>0 .0489468 .0096185 .0295857 .068308
Tier 2 if Tier2>0 .0089428 .001337 .0060753 .0118103
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Figure 25: Systemic banks: Tier1 hybrid instruments' impact over RWA relative to total
assets.
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Figure 26: Systemic banks: Tier2 hybrid instruments' impact over RWA relative to total
assets.
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Table 31: In this table, we display the results the impact hybrids capital have on banks'
growth opportunities. We use the Q ratio as our proxy for banks' growth opportunities and
it is deﬁned as the ratio between the market value of the assets and the book value. We
perform the following regression: Qi,t = α + β1ADTier1i,t + β2Tier2i,t + β3ADTier12i,t +
β4Tier22i,t + γControlsi,t + δi + τt + vi,t. The regression has robust standard errors and
includes controls for leverage, bank quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. In the ﬁrst column it is performed
on the whole sample, in the second column on the sub-sample of non systemic banks and in
the third column we display results for the systemic sub-sample
(1) (Non Systemic) (Systemic)
ADTier1 0.0359 0.0387 0.3333
(2.09)** (2.17)** (1.42)
Tier2 0.1055 0.1713 -0.3740
(0.60) (0.85) (0.13)
ADTier12 -0.0081 -0.0085 -1.1507
(1.80)* (1.89)* (1.44)
Tier22 -0.6819 -0.9873 -82.5165
(0.96) (1.23) (0.41)
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.30
N 1,543 1,158 385
Table 32: Tests: overall results of the hybrids impact over Q ratio
Statistic for Testnl chi2 Prob>chi2 Min (bps) Not signiﬁcant bef./aft.
ADT1 −β[ADTier1]/(2 ∗ β[ADTier12]) = 0 76.84 0.000 220.77335 25
Tier2 −β[Tier2]/(2 ∗ β[Tier22]) = 0 2.24 0.1346 7.733651 NA
Table 33: Overall sample: Mean estimation
Statistic for Mean Std. Err. Conf. intervals 95%
Tier 1 if ADTier1>0 .529807 .0580228 .4155704 .6440436
Tier 2 if Tier2>0 .1087488 .0120724 .0845919 .1329057
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Figure 27: Tier1 hybrid instruments' impact over Q ratio.
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Figure 28: Tier2 hybrid instruments' impact over Q ratio.
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Table 34: Tests for non systemic banks: results of the hybrids impact over Q ratio
Statistic for Testnl chi2 Prob>chi2 Min (bps) Not signiﬁcant bef./aft.
ADT1 non systemic −β[ADTier1]/(2 ∗ β[ADTier12]) = 0 57.72 0.000 227.2684 38
Tier2 non systemic −β[Tier2]/(2 ∗ β[Tier22]) = 0 6.13 0.0133 8.676156 NA
Table 35: Non Systemic banks: Mean estimation
Statistic for Mean Std. Err. Conf. intervals 95%
Tier 1 if ADTier1>0 .6311542 .0683327 .4964904 .7658181
Tier 2 if Tier2>0 .1420174 .0126398 .1165436 .1674913
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Figure 29: Non systemic banks: Tier1 hybrid instruments' impact over Q ratio.
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Figure 30: Non systemic banks: Tier2 hybrid instruments' impact over Q ratio.
Table 36: Tests for systemic banks: results of the hybrids impact over Q ratio
Statistic for Testnl chi2 Prob>chi2 Min (bps) Not signiﬁcant bef./aft.
ADT1 systemic −β[ADTier1]/(2 ∗ β[ADTier12]) = 0 270.48 0.0000 14.481069 NA
Tier2 systemic −β[Tier2]/(2 ∗ β[Tier22]) = 0 0.01 0.9191 -.22661568 NA
Table 37: Systemic banks: Mean estimation
Statistic for Mean Std. Err. Conf. intervals 95%
Tier 1 if ADTier1>0 .0489468 .0096185 .0295857 .068308
Tier 2 if Tier2>0 .0089428 .001337 .0060753 .0118103
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Figure 31: Systemic banks: Tier1 hybrid instruments' impact over Q ratio.
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Figure 32: Systemic banks: Tier2 hybrid instruments' impact over Q ratio.
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19.1 Robustness check: the model Setup and results
19.1.1 Bank Structure
The Bank Structure is considered in a continuous time framework, with initial date t = 0 and
terminal date t = T . We focus on Fr (T ), i.e. future growth opportunities. They materialize only
at the end of the period, T , but the franchise value might vanish previously, as soon as the liabilities
exceeds the asset value in 0 ≤ t ≤ T , that is when
τFr=0 = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : A (t) ≤MV SD +Dep} . (44)
We call the MVA the sum of the tangible value of the Assets and franchise value. Their dynamic
is:
d ln (MVA (t)) =
(
µMVAt −
σ2MVA
2
t
)
dt+ σMVAdBt, (45)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, the drift, µt, is time-varying and σ is constant and both are
referred to the sum of the tangible value of the assets and the franchise value. Similar to Babbel and
Merrill (2005) and Barone-Adesi et al. (2014), we split the value of the bank into three components.
First, considering the limited liability, the market value of the equity of our bank is a call option
on the assets: E(T ) := max(A(T ) − L), where A is the value of the banks' assets and L the face
value of the liabilities.Second, let's split the value of equity into the following two components:
E(T ) := X(T ) + Putdef (T ), where X(T ) := A(T ) − L is the net tangible value of the bank,
without considering the limited liability, which is represented through the default put option.
Third, we allow the bank to be able to invest in value creating opportunities at time T, through the
introduction of the franchise value Fr(T ). Hence, E(T ) := X(T ) + Putdef (T ) + Fr(T ). Taking
into account the diﬀerent sources of ﬁnancing for our bank (deposits, standard debt and CoCos),
the end of the period equity market value is given by the three components: the net tangible value,
the shareholders' option to default, the franchise value.
Tier1 (T ) = A (T )−Dep− FV SD (T )
+Fr (T ) + Putdef (T ) .
CoCos conversion occurs at
τConv = inf {t ≥ 0 : A (t) ≤ VConv} .
112
19.1.2 Pricing the default option
Potential arbitrage opportunities, that could arise buying the bank and selling short the tangible
assets and the franchise value. To prevent arbitrage: the underlying is given by the sum of both
franchise value and market value of the assets. The extended standard pricing:
Putdef (lev, σMVA, rf) =
(
MV SD +Dep
)
Φ (−d2) +
(− (MVA) Φ (−d1)) ,
with {τFr=0 > T},
where d1 =
 ln( 11−lev )+(rf+σ2MVA2 )T
σMVA
√
T
 ,
lev =
(
T ier1
MVA
)
, d2 = d1 − σMVA
√
T ,Φ− standardNormal
(46)
The greeks for this option are given as follows:
Sensitivity to leverage :
[
δPutdefi,t
δlevi,t
]
< 0
Sensitivity to volatility :
[
δPutdefi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to policy − rate :
[
δPutdefi,t
δrfi,t
]
< 0
(47)
19.1.3 Pricing the DOC option, in presence of non-observable underlying
The unobservable value of potential growth is Fr, which is net of investment costs, thus the strike
is set to zero. When the bank does not default, MVA(0) > MV SD, the pricing is:
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DOC (lev, σMVA, rf) = Fr [Φ (v1) +
− (1− lev)2λ Φ (y1)
]
with {τFr=0 > T} ,
where λ =
rf+
σ2MVA
2
σ2MVA
v1 =
ln( 11−lev )
σMVA
√
T
+ λσMVA
√
T , y1 =
ln(1−lev)
σMVA
√
T
+ λσMVA
√
T
(48)
The standard greeks for this option are given as follows:
Sensitivity to leverage :
[
δDOCi,t
δlevi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to volatility :
[
δDOCi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
> 0
Sensitivity to policy − rate :
[
δDOCi,t
δrfi,t
]
> 0
(49)
19.1.4 The optimization problem
We split the optimization problem for risk appetite into two steps.
The ﬁrst step.
We estimate the unobservable franchise value and the market value of the assets, which are embedded
in the equity market value. We minimize the distance between the data concerning the MVE and
the model, through the non linear least squares criterion function. We perform a step by step
optimization for Θi,t := Fri,t, Ai,t, σMVAi,t , solving simultaneously: e1,i,t= MVEi,t−(Ai,t−MV (D+L)+DOC+Putdef ),
e2,i,t= σMVEi,tMVEi,t−σMVAi,t (MVAi,t)Φ(d1i,t),
(50)
The non linear least square function is the following:
Θ∗i,t = argmin
∑2,n,m
j,i,t=1
[
e2j,i,t
]
(Θi,t)
(51)
The second step.
We look for the optimal level of leverage, assets' and franchise value's volatility and policy rate
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(Θi,t :=
(
levi,t, σMVAi,t , rfi,t
)
) that simultaneously optimize the objective function (O.f.), deﬁned
as:
O.f.i,t :=
DOC (Θi,t) + PUT
def (Θi,t)
Ai,t
. (52)
When MV SD < MV A (0), the optimization problem is:
Θ∗i,t =
argmax
Θi,t
[Ofi,t] (53)
The shape of risk appetite is assessed through the determinant of the hessian matrix in a three-
dimensional perspective. Setting the sensitivity to leverage, vega and rho equal to zero.
leverage− driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δlevi,t
]
= 0 |σ∗MVAi,t ,rf∗i,t
volatility − driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δσMVAi,t
]
= 0 |lev∗i,t,rf∗i,t
policy − rate− driven R.A. :
[
δOfi,t
δrfi,t
]
= 0 |lev∗i,t,σ∗MVAi,t
(54)
Estimating the optimal value of CoCos to issue:
CoCoi,t :=
(
lev∗i,t − levacti,t
)
, (55)
19.1.5 The results: a comparison
Table 38: Summary statistics of the key optimized variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Opt_Vol 1135 0.036 0.015 0.0001 0.025 0.076
Opt_lev 1135 0.077 0.048 0.0002 0.080 0.167
Opt_ADTier1 1135 0.017 0.056 −0.136 0.020 0.134
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Figure 33: Objective function optimization, maximum reached for an average leverage of 7%
to 8%, that is given our results an average issue of CoCos and WDs belonging to AD Tier 1
of 1.7% and a median optimal volatility of 2.5%.
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Conclusions
In summer 2017, after the high school ﬁnal exam, I was at the seaside discussing with my mother
about my future. She asked why I was interested in studying economics. I answered that this was
the medium I preferred to understand the world where I was living. At that time, newspapers, and
all over the media, you could ﬁnd many articles and pieces of news about worldwide economics and
ﬁnance. It was the beginning of the crisis. I had the privilege to hear about the failure of Lehman
Brothers during microeconomics class, early in my second year of the Bachelor. I ﬁnished one term
in advance my Master in Banking and Finance, a couple of days before my 23rd birthday. I was very
curious and motivated to study and had the privilege to enter the SFI PhD Student Program at USI.
Learning from the crisis makes everyone better oﬀ. Overall, we show that Basel III rule proposes
a great incentive pushing the decrease of the RWAs and the increase in solidity, via the promotion
of the enlargement of the Tier 1. However, there is still room for pushing banks to decrease the
riskiness of its assets. Theoretically, we ﬁnd that hybrids are helpful and promote the increase in
bank value itself only if associated with a relative low level of volatility. Empirically, we ﬁnd that, on
one side, the relation between hybrids and bank riskiness is described by a U-shaped curve and, on
the other side, with respect to growth opportunities, we have a inverted-U shaped curve, leading to a
trade-oﬀ. Hence, banks should make an eﬀort in ﬁnding a balance between containing bank riskiness
and contemporaneously promoting bank growth. We leave unanswered questions and, above all, it
should be interesting to assess more deeply the role of the monetary policy, accounting for other
relevant variables, such inﬂation rate or unemployment rate.
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